Upjohn Press

Upjohn Research home page

1-1-2016

The Economics of Health
Donald J. Meyer, Editor
Western Michigan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press
Part of the Health Economics Commons, and the Health Policy Commons

Citation
Meyer, Donald J., ed. 2016. The Economics of Health. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/9780880994644

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 4.0 International
License.

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

The Economics of Health

The Economics of Health

Donald J. Meyer

2016

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Meyer, Donald J., editor.
Title: The economics of health / [edited by] Donald Meyer.
Description: Kalamazoo, Michigan : W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research,
2016. | Includes index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016005812| ISBN 9780880994620 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN
0880994622 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780880994637 (hardcover : alk. paper) |
ISBN 0880994630 (hardcover : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Medical economics.
Classification: LCC RA410 .E2873 2016 | DDC 338.4/73621—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016005812

© 2016
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686

The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.

Contents
Acknowledgments

vii

1 Introduction
Donald J. Meyer

1

2 We Have Met Our Enemies and They Are Us
Charles E. Phelps

7

3 Do Medical Care and Self-Care Compete or Complement in
Health Production?
Donald J. Meyer

35

4 Payment Reform and “Bending the Curve”
John H. Goddeeris

51

5 The Potential Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Disability
Insurance and Workers’ Compensation
Marcus Dillender

81

6 The Economic Challenges of the Community Living Assistance
Services and Supports Act
Edward C. Norton

103

7 The Role of Private Health Insurance in the Medicare Program
M. Kate Bundorf

117

Authors

143

Index

145

About the Institute

155

v

Acknowledgments
The chapters in this book are based on presentations made at the fortyeighth annual Werner Sichel Economics Lecture Series, hosted by the Department of Economics during the 2012–2013 academic year on the campus of
Western Michigan University. The series is made possible through financial
support of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and Western
Michigan University (WMU). It is named for Dr. Werner Sichel, who retired in
2005 following 45 years of teaching at WMU.

vii

1
Introduction
Donald J. Meyer
Western Michigan University

Securing good health is vitally important for each of us individually,
as well as for our society as a whole. In fact, maintaining an acceptable
level of health is necessary to adequately function in our daily lives.
Health brings us happiness with the ability to feel good, to be pain-free,
and to enjoy life. We yearn to have a rich, fulfilling life, and good health
is the vehicle for being able to do so; it allows us to function productively in our jobs and reduces our number of sick days, which results in
additional income and a higher standard of living.
The importance of good health extends to our overall economy as
well. Health care makes up about 17 percent of our national economy
and thus greatly affects our macroeconomy. Rising health care costs
have presented challenges for the national budget, and incentive issues
due to health uncertainty and asymmetric information have important
market implications for our health economy. Furthermore, the obesity
epidemic in our country is an alarming situation, contributing to deteriorating health, premature death, and escalating health care costs.
The passage and recent implementation of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has been extremely controversial.
Important components of this historic act include the contentious personal mandate, the newly established state exchanges, and Medicaid
expansion. Although the purpose of this book is not to critique the
ACA, several chapters in this volume do evaluate how specific aspects
of the ACA affect our economy.
When addressing or modeling health, economists typically posit a
utility function U(C,H), where consumers derive utility from consuming various goods and services (C), as well as from the level of health
(H) they possess. Health can be thought of as an economic good that
consumers work to acquire, similar to a stock or consumer durable,
such as an automobile or a refrigerator. We need to model utility over
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time and consider investments made to our health stock over our lifetimes. Utility maximization requires a trade-off between investing our
scarce time and money into the acquisition of health or the consumption
of other goods and services.
A significant aspect of the market for health is that the health level
to be consumed must be produced by the same individual—that is, none
of the health we wish to consume can be purchased as such in the marketplace. This is a very atypical situation in our economy; generally,
consumers do not produce the good, they purchase it in the marketplace. It is similar to a family farmer who can eat only the vegetables
that he grows himself. This leads to less specialization in production
and more generalization.
Thus it becomes important to consider how one best produces an
acceptable level of health for present and future consumption. Two significant inputs into the production of health are medical care and lifestyle choice or self-care. Doctor visits, medical procedures, and pharmaceuticals help improve our health; many of us receive these services
through health insurance coverage that we purchase or obtain through
our employers. Personal choices, such as the amount of physical exercise we get, our alcohol consumption, and calorie intake also influence
our health. Other inputs that affect our health include education level,
random health shocks, and the environment in which we live.
Uncertainty pervades over health determination, as our health status
even one or two years into the future is highly unknown or uncertain.
Our attitude toward the risk is very important in determining how we
manage it. Buying insurance is one response to facing a random loss
due to illness or disease. Health insurance is central to one’s insurance
portfolio, but other types of insurance can help in the events of becoming disabled, getting hurt on the job, or requiring assisted living. One
can also invest in self-protection or self-insurance through a healthier
lifestyle, including eating better food, exercising, and limiting alcohol
and tobacco consumption.
Health markets are also heavily subject to situations of asymmetric information—when one party knows more information than another
party about some health aspect. Adverse selection, nonrepresentative
risk pools, and death spirals can result when individuals know more
about their health risks than the insurance companies. Moral hazard,
or a change in behavior upon having insurance, can cause people to
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take on more health risks or overpurchase health insurance. The agency
problem involves the challenge of hiring doctors or other health professionals to investigate our health issues and make decisions that are in
our best interests.
This book contains six chapters that address various aspects of
health. Charles E. Phelps begins the volume with “We Have Met Our
Enemies and They Are Us.” This provocative title refers to the fact that
many of us in the United States do not make good lifestyle choices.
Phelps cites a study that shows that poor choices regarding tobacco
usage, eating, activity, and alcohol consumption make up the leading
causes of death in the United States. He suggests working to improve
the educational system, as education rates are generally positively correlated with making healthier lifestyle choices.
Phelps finds a direct relationship between medical spending and
both income and life expectancy, but an inverse relation between medical spending and infant mortality. The extent to which the United States
is a major outlier is surprising; we spend far more on medicine than any
other country and have health results that are far from what our health
expenditures would predict.
Chapter 3, “Do Medical Care and Self-Care Compete or Complement in Health Production?,” by Donald J. Meyer, focuses on two of the
primary input categories in one’s health production function, medical
care and self-care. He asks whether these two input types function more
closely as substitutes or complements. Loosely speaking, are medical
care and self-care more often used in combination with each other, or
do individuals more likely choose one over the other? Meyer reviews
arguments for each of these ideas, the complementarity relations that
competing risk models indicate and the basic substitution effect based
on relative prices and productivities.
Meyer first notes the two basic definitions in neoclassical production of two inputs having a complement or substitute relation. He then
argues that this issue is more appropriately viewed in the context of significant uncertainty, a primary characteristic of the health setting. A common response to decision making under uncertainty is the attainment of
market insurance and/or the practice of undertaking self-insurance or
self-protection, two categories of self-care. Meyer reviews much of the
literature in which researchers have debated whether these uncertainty
responses are used more in a complementarity or substitution manner.
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He recognizes and discusses the close link that exists between medical care and health insurance, thus enabling a more enriched definition
of complements and substitutes between medical care and self-care in
the health context. He then reviews three articles that have examined
whether medical care and self-care are better described as complements
or substitutes, and he offers his own opinions as well.
The next three chapters deal with some aspect of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). John H. Goddeeris’s chapter
is entitled “Payment Reform and ‘Bending the Curve.’” The “bending the curve” phrase has been attributed to President Barack Obama,
who in 2009 said, “It is important for us to bend the cost curve . . .
because the system we have right now is unsustainable . . .” This refers
to the challenge of keeping health care costs under control and limiting
the rate of annual increase of the costs. Goddeeris considers one such
possible curve—health care costs as a percentage of gross domestic
product—which has been growing consistently over the last 50 years
and has reached a level of about 17 percent.
Goddeeris then addresses ways in which health care providers are
paid, which he argues is a critical component of bending the curve. He
examines aspects of paying for output rather than inputs, managed competition, and bundling by episode. Goddeeris argues for a more global
payment method regarding some specific defined population versus a
traditional fee-for-service plan. He discusses in detail the idea of an
Accountable Care Organization and how this might better function in
terms of incentives for receiving care and controlling costs.
Marcus Dillender’s chapter is entitled “The Potential Effects of the
Affordable Care Act on Disability Insurance and Workers’ Compensation.” Disability insurance covers people who are unable to work for
over a year due to health concerns, and workers’ compensation insurance pays medical costs for people who get injured while working
on the job. These two types of insurance that relate to how the risk of
health deterioration affects one’s earning or income potential are sometimes overlooked by individuals who are concerned about addressing
health risks in general.
The two main sections of the chapter examine basic program information for disability insurance and workers’ compensation and how the
ACA affects the likelihood of filing a claim for these types of insurance.
Dillender also considers how the ACA may affect our health system

Introduction 5

more generally, which can then indirectly spill over to the two types of
insurance.
Edward C. Norton considers the issue of long-term care in his chapter, “The Economic Challenges of the The Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act.” The CLASS Act was a major component of the original ACA, but it ultimately was not supported and was
struck from the act that passed in 2010. It would have created a market
for long-term care with a number of interesting features. He reviews the
expenditure needs of the typical elderly individual and notes that longterm care offers the greatest variance in out-of-pocket expense and thus
is the riskiest issue facing the elderly.
Norton discusses why the CLASS Act was dropped from the ACA
legislation, and he suggests that the proposed act faced many significant
economic challenges. One challenge was adverse selection and moral
hazard, present in all insurance markets but even more pronounced
in the elderly long-term care market. Another challenge was inflation
risk—claims made for long-term care insurance are often made decades
into the future, when the purchasing power of your benefit amount is
subject to years of inflationary erosion. Norton also suggests that the
long-run viability of the program was in question due to the financial
instability of funding the program long term.
Chapter 7, by M. Kate Bundorf, is entitled “The Role of Private
Health Insurance in the Medicare Program.” Bundorf introduces her
topic by laying out the basic Medicare system in the United States.
Parts A and B make up traditional Medicare originating in 1965 and
cover hospital, physician, outpatient, and other standard forms of health
care services. Part D was added under the Medicare Modernization Act
of 2003 and adds outpatient prescription drug benefits.
Bundorf then focuses on two forms of private insurance that interact with the Medicare system. The first is Medicare Part C, or Medicare
Advantage, which allows beneficiaries to enroll in a private plan that
replaces traditional Medicare (parts A and B). The second is Medigap,
a private policy that supplements existing Medicare. Medigap policies
reduce deductibles and cover copays, reducing personal cost liability.
This tends to accentuate moral hazard, as Bundorf notes. She evaluates
the two different programs and how they have both increased Medicare
spending over the years and then discusses how future Medicare reform
may be differentially affected by the two plans.
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Good health is a characteristic that is crucial to all of us individually and collectively as a country. The United States is challenged
in its world ranking in health statistics, which is likely to become an
even larger challenge as its population ages over the next few decades
(Phelps discusses this in Chapter 2). Education in general appears to
be an ally for good health and for becoming better informed about our
health system, and it helps reduce uncertainty and aids in better decision making for all of us. The chapters in this volume contribute to this
end and are indicative of the type of health research work that is needed.

2
We Have Met Our
Enemies and They Are Us
Charles E. Phelps
University of Rochester

HEALTH CARE SPENDING AND OUTCOMES—
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Many critics (and even some proponents) of the U.S. health care
system note two things: 1) we spend a lot of money on health care, far
more than any other country in the world; and 2) we don’t get the best
health outcomes in return.
Let’s first look at health care spending. Figure 2.1 shows U.S.
spending per capita against per capita gross domestic product (GDP),
with other countries’ incomes and spending standardized to U.S. dollars using appropriate exchange rates. These data (from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]) show a
remarkable pattern—as per capita GDP rises, medical spending rises
at a very predictable rate (at about 1.5 × the rate of per capita GDP).1
One remarkable feature is how close to the best-fit line we can find
countries with incredibly different health care systems, including Great
Britain (with a socialized health care system), Canada (with a socialized
health insurance system but private production of health care itself),
Germany and Japan (with private production but mixed insurance systems), Sweden (with county-level government health plans), and Australia (with a system not much different from that in the United States).
All of these nations, despite the differing roles of government in their
health care structure, have essentially the same spending on health care
once taking into account the predictable differences due to per-capita
GDP differences.
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Figure 2.1 Income and Medical Spending in OECD Countries
7,000

Per capita medical spending ($)

6,000
5,000
4,000

1. Australia
2. Austria
3. Belgium
4. Canada
5. Czech Republic
6. Denmark
7. Finland
8. France
9. Germany

10. Greece
11. Hungary
12. Iceland
13. Ireland
14. Italy
15. Japan
16. South Korea
17. Netherlands
18. New Zealand

3,000

1,000
0
10,000

18

20

2,000
21

11

5

26

19. Poland
20. Portugal
21. Slovak Republic
22. Spain
23. Sweden
24. Switzerland
25. United Kingdom
26. United States
24
4 2 17
98
3 6
12
23 1
13
25
14 15 7
22 10

16

19

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

Per capita income ($)
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The United States looms as an outlier on the regression line fitted
from other nations’ data points. We are wealthier than other countries,
but our medical spending far outstrips the level predicted from the bestfit regression line. We have demonstrably profligate spending habits for
health care.
When looking at our health outcomes, a gloomier picture emerges.
The United States again sits as an outlier but clearly in the wrong direction. Figure 2.2 shows how life expectancy at birth and per capita medical spending correlate. The pattern is not nearly as tight as that between
medical spending and per capita GDP, but a recognizable (albeit fuzzy)
link exists between medical spending and health outcomes. In general,
countries that spend more have better longevity. Japan looms large as a
happy outlier—it has the highest life expectancy in the world, despite
relatively middle-of-the-road medical spending. Genetics likely plays a
role, but dietary choices have a large effect. When first-generation Japanese move to Hawaii, they maintain their Japanese longevity if they
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Figure 2.2 Life Expectancy and Medical Spending for OECD Countries
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retain traditional Japanese dietary patterns, but if they acquire American dining habits, they also acquire American mortality rates (Kolonel,
Hinds, and Hankin 1980; Tanabe, n.d.).
A clearer picture emerges when looking at infant mortality rates,
as shown in Figure 2.3. Here the pattern is crisper than with life expectancy at birth, but once again we can see that more medical spending
generally reduces perinatal mortality; the United States has far-worse
outcomes than the best-fit line would predict. We in fact have perinatal
mortality rates normally associated with countries with about one-third
of our medical care spending rate, including Portugal and the former
Warsaw Pact state of the Slovak Republic. The United States has about
triple the infant mortality rate that the best-fit regression line would
predict.
This gloomy portrait of our health care system has many root
causes, some of which I explore later in this chapter. Before moving
to that, however, we need a quick peek into the future. Here’s a hint:
Things will get worse, not better.
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Figure 2.3 Infant Mortality vs. Medical Spending in OECD Countries

8
7
Infant mortality per 1,000 births

8. France
9. Germany
10. Greece
11. Hungary
12. Iceland
13. Ireland
14. Italy

1. Australia
2. Austria
3. Belgium
4. Canada
5. Czech Republic
6. Denmark
7. Finland
21

6

19

16
10

26

11
18

3

22. Spain
23. Sweden
24. Switzerland
25. United Kingdom
26. United States

8

5
4

15. Japan
16. South Korea
17. Netherlands
18. New Zealand
19. Poland
20. Portugal
21. Slovak Republic

5

20

25

1

4
17

9

24

3
2214 13 6
2
7
15

23

2
12

1
0

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

Per capita medical spending ($)

SOURCE: Author’s calculations using OECD data.

THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL IS A TRAIN
COMING AT US
Demographers show the age mix of a country’s population using
what they used to call “population pyramids.” The horizontal bars in
these graphs represent age groups, older as one moves up the pyramid.
The left side shows males, the other shows females. They are called
pyramids because they are wide at the base (youngest age groups) and
narrower at the top (older age groups), reflecting increased mortality as
we get older.
Over time, however, these pyramids can change shape, and in very
predictable ways, depending on how long people live and the birth rate
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that brings new entrants into the population (babies). Figures 2.4A,
2.4B, and 2.4C show current projections from the U.S. Census Bureau
for the population that embeds predictions about future age-specific
mortality rates and also birth rates. The 1950 chart shows a typical
pyramid, pinched in at the bottom, however, both for losses to military
deaths and lower fertility rates during World War II. It also shows the
baby boom at the end of the war (the wide band for 0–4-year-olds) that
has important consequences for later years’ forecasts. Now, skip ahead
to the 2000 pyramid. These data are also known with certainty. The
baby boom of the 1945–1950 era (and nearby cohorts) has now moved
into middle age, and the pyramid shows a hefty “middle-aged spread,”
not unlike that of a lot of the actual baby boomers. Note also the lopsided and enlarged age mix at the top. The pyramid no longer comes
to a point, and it is very decidedly female. Women outlive men in the
United States by about five years, mostly owing to the effects of earlier
cigarette smoking. Very large fractions of our nursing home populations
are women who were widowed many years earlier in their lives.
Skipping ahead to 2025 and 2050 involves making projections
about the future, which demographers do using models to forecast agespecific mortality rates and also to forecast birth rates. The 2025 forecasts show an increasingly top-heavy age distribution, and by 2050, the
pyramid turns into a shape like a graduation cap—it has far more people
in the 80+ age group than any other five-year interval, and the ratio of
working age to retired has become very unfavorable. Some pundits now
call this the “Silver Tsunami.”
Health care spending rises rapidly with the number of chronic conditions (see Figure 2.5), which are closely linked to age as our bodies
wear out faster and faster. It does not take a complex computer program
to tell us that the combination of an aging population and the increased
rate of medical spending with age and its associated increase in chronic
conditions will inevitably lead to increasingly higher health care spending. Unless something dramatically changes, U.S. spending could easily exceed one-fourth—perhaps even one-third—of GDP on health care
by 2050. Spending rates will inevitably rise over time. Our only meaningful goal is to somehow cut down the rate of growth. Health care pundits call this “bending the curve.” Subsequent sections in this chapter
discuss ways to do this that lie outside the realm of health care reform.
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Figure 2.4 Age Profiles for U.S. Population, 1950–2050
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Figure 2.4 (continued)
Panel C: 2025
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Figure 2.5 Average Health Care Spending per Capita, by Number of
Chronic Conditions, 2010
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We Are Our Own Worst Enemy
Most people in the United States don’t understand the true causes of
death and the large medical costs that arise as we try to stave it off. We
read about and witness deaths from heart disease, cancer, and stroke,
but these are just the natural consequences of the true causes of death.
The brutal truth is that, for many, personal choices are often the primary
true causes of our illness and death.
In a powerful study combining epidemiologic studies and mortality
data, McGinnis and Foege (1993) look at the excess mortality arising
from various lifestyle choices and combine that with death certificate
data to come to an astonishing conclusion: the leading cause of death
in the United States is our own behavior. To see how this works, suppose that last year 1,000 people died of Disease X—the death certificate would show that disease is the cause. Now, suppose that of those
1,000 people, 750 were tobacco users. Since only about 25 percent of
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the U.S. population smokes, tobacco users are overrepresented among
those who died of Disease X by a factor of three. If the disease were
unrelated to tobacco use, we would expect to find only 250 tobacco
users among the 1,000 who died of Disease X, but we actually saw 750.
So, we attribute 500 excess deaths from Disease X to tobacco.
Now, do the same thing for other diseases, such as lung cancer,
many other types of cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
heart attack, heart failure, and stroke, and then add up the excess deaths
attributed to tobacco. When you finish that list, tobacco, it turns out, is
the leading cause of death in the United States. Mokdad et al. (2004)
redid the original study 10 years later using data from 2000. The results,
shown in Figure 2.6, are quite stunning. These nine causes of death
account for about half of all deaths, and most of these—surely we
would include tobacco, diet/inactivity, alcohol, motor vehicle accident,
firearms, sexual behavior, and illicit drug use—are wholly matters of
human behavior and choice. One could easily include toxic agents in
the list as well (primarily consequences of air and water pollution), but
that may be more of a societal issue rather than an individual choice.
Let’s look at the most important of these in more detail.
Figure 2.6 Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000
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Tobacco
Despite the enormous mortality burden from tobacco, the problem
is actually lessening. Some of the decline comes from improved cancer
treatment (arising in part from NIH research), but much of it is attributed to reduced smoking rates. Americans now smoke at about half the
rate they did in 1965. Figure 2.7 shows per-adult cigarette consumption
patterns from 1900 to 2010.
Many things converged to cause this sea change. Most importantly,
a 1964 report from the U.S. surgeon general greatly shifted patterns
of tobacco use over time and spurred many cultural and legal changes
(U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1964).2
Warning labels appeared on cigarette packages. Television ads for
tobacco were banned, and antismoking ads were aired instead. Local
and state governments banned smoking in restaurants. Smoking was
no longer permitted on airplanes and in most airports. Cigarette taxes
Figure 2.7 Cigarettes Smoked per Year in the United States
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SOURCE: Warner (1989) and author’s calculations using data from the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention.
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increased dramatically. The smoking culture changed. Before the surgeon general’s report, cigarette smoking was a standard Hollywood
sign of sophistication. Ayn Rand praised smoking extensively in The
Fountainhead (1943). People smoked in restaurants, in homes, in the
park, on trains, in hotel rooms—everywhere, both public and private.
Now the public perception of smoking is quite different: it is widely
considered a sign of ignorance and/or irrational behavior.
Over time, many antismoking laws have been passed, and many
jurisdictions (both in the United States and worldwide) have made
smoking illegal not only in most indoor public settings but in many
outdoor places as well. And it is certainly considered ill-mannered for
people to light up in any private home without permission. All of these
cultural and legal changes came from one source—a government report.
Now, instead of nearly half of the population smoking cigarettes, fewer
than 20 percent do so. By convening the committee to write this report,
Dr. Luther Terry, the then surgeon general, may have saved more lives
than any other physician in history.
Eschewing the Fat?
The next causes of death I address here are poor diet and lack of
exercise. It is perhaps politically incorrect to say this, but the evidence
seems clear: fat kills. Being overly skinny is also unhealthy, but that’s
generally not the weight problem that affects most people.
To understand the definition of overweight, we need to define the
body mass index (BMI), which is widely used to measure obesity,
defined (in metric measurements) as weight (in kilograms) divided by
height (in meters) squared.3
Standard ranges for adults are as follows: normal, 22–24; overweight, 25–29; obese, 30–35; and morbidly obese, over 35. An increasing proportion of the U.S. population falls into the obese and morbidly
obese categories. There is a national epidemic of obesity, yet it draws
far less attention than do many far less dangerous epidemics of various
“bugs.”
First, let’s look at the data on the growth in obesity. Figure 2.8 shows
data from regular surveys of the U.S. population beginning in 1960. The
percent of adults classified as “overweight” (BMI between 25 and 30)
stays essentially flat at about a third of the population throughout this
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Figure 2.8 Obesity Trends in the United States
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half century, but those who are obese (BMI between 30 and 40) begins
to climb rapidly after about 1980. The combined group of “obese” and
“extremely obese” grew from under 15 percent in 1960 to 42 percent in
the most recent years—a tripling of the rate of obesity and now almost
half of the adult population. Similar data (not shown) reveal a similar
pattern for adolescents and children.
Now let’s look at the effects of obesity on health and consider the
ultimate indicator of health: survival rates. Figure 2.9 shows the relative
risk of death (in any single year) by BMI category, separately for men
and women, using the lowest-risk group as 1. Thus, a relative risk of 1.5
means a person has a 50 percent greater chance of dying than a person
in the best BMI group.4
The width of the bars shows the statistical imprecision (which gets
worse as the number of people in each group shrinks), but the midpoint
of each bar shows the average relative risk.
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Figure 2.9 Body Mass Index (BMI) and All-Cause Mortality
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For both men and women, the best survival rates appear in the
groups with a BMI of 23.5–24.9. The relative risk climbs both for people with lower and higher weight than this “most-protective” BMI. But,
as the data in Figure 2.8 show, our problem in the United States is not
an epidemic of underweight, but rather the opposite—obesity.
Obesity causes many disorders that degrade the quality of life, and
its associated diseases reduce people’s ability to do many enjoyable
things in life. It increases the risk of hypertension (half of all hypertension comes from obesity), heart disease, numerous cancers, sleep
apnea, abdominal hernias, gout, and varicose veins. For people who
are obese, the risk of diabetes triples, and with diabetes comes other
ailments such as vision problems, skin breakdown, and further risk of
heart disease. Bringing body weight into normal ranges (BMI of about
23–25) can eliminate about 40 percent of all heart disease.
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Stewart, Cutler, and Rosen (2009) calculate the average quality of
life people report in different age groups by BMI category and smoking
status, because of all the chronic conditions brought about by smoking
and obesity, both have systematic effects on the quality of life people
report (see Figure 2.10). Where 100 is perfect health, quality scores fall
as BMI rises, and they also are worse for smokers than for nonsmokers.
At almost every age, an obese smoker reports about 80 percent of the
quality of life as the normal-weight nonsmoker.
Obesity costs a lot of money. The Centers for Disease Control
pegged the costs of obesity-related diseases at nearly $150 billion per
year in 2008 (Finkelstein et al. 2009). The average obese person uses
about $1,500 more—approximately 40 percent—per year in medical
services than a person of normal weight. This affects tax dollars through
the funding of Medicare and Medicaid, and the costs of our private
insurance go up in the same way because obese people pay the same
premium as nonobese people.
Alcohol
To understand the health effects of alcohol, we need to bring two
concepts into the picture. First, the real health problems come with
heavy drinking and binge drinking.5 Heavy drinking is known to
increase the risk of various cancers, liver disease (particularly cirrhosis), and heart disease. However, almost ironically, regular moderate
alcohol use seems to have a series of health-protective aspects, especially with regard to heart disease, more so when the alcohol of choice
is wine, and especially so for some red wines with high levels of particularly beneficial complex chemicals.6 A large study of Danish adults
(Grønbaek et al. 2000) finds that heavy drinkers of distilled spirits had
about double the cancer risk of nondrinkers, but those who drank wine
moderately (not heavy or binge) had a 20 percent lower all-cause mortality rate and almost cut the risk of heart disease in half (compared with
nondrinkers).
We Are Fighting the Wrong Drug War
The official war on drugs focuses on substances such as marijuana,
cocaine, and heroin, but those drugs account for less than 1 percent of
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Figure 2.10 Quality of Life by Smoking and BMI Status
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all deaths in the United States. Tobacco, on the other hand, causes 18
percent of the deaths in our country every year. Alcohol adds another
3.5 percent, for a total of 21.5 percent for these two legal drugs. This
means that tobacco and alcohol account for 30 times as many deaths
each year as do illicit drugs. Tobacco alone accounts for over 25 times
the number of deaths as illicit drugs.
If we were to count obesity as an addictive problem (as some people do), we could add another 16.6 percent to the deaths associated
with addictive behavior—tobacco, calories, alcohol, and illicit drugs.
Together they total 39 percent of the nation’s deaths. The conclusion
seems obvious: we are fighting the wrong drug war. The big health issue
isn’t illicit drugs, it’s tobacco and obesity.
The European Paradox
Some people have asked me, “If smoking and obesity are the real
issues, why don’t the Europeans (or the Japanese) have health costs
higher than ours, since they smoke at much higher rates than we do?” It
is an excellent question for which I do not have a conclusive answer; I
have only a few ideas to help think about the issue.
First, if people in Europe or Japan smoked less, the smoking/risk
data almost guarantee that their health costs would fall. Second, we are
just beginning to reap the benefits of the gradual decline in smoking
rates in the United States.
Further, the Europeans mostly have implicit or explicit rationing
mechanisms in their health care systems that put caps on costs in a way
that selectively saves costs due to smoking. Part of this comes from
the observation that smokers die early in their lives, thus precluding
their incurring some other potentially expensive diseases (Manning et
al. 1989). But in most European societies, deaths that would involve
expensive hospitalization in the United States, cancer treatment, and
intensive care do not get treated the same way. For example, half of
all deaths in the United States involve intensive care, whereas in Great
Britain, only 1 in 10 does (Wunsch et al. 2009).
Intensive care unit use for cancers is three to four times higher in the
United States than in Britain and eight times higher for strokes, two of
the main “death certificate” causes of death of smokers.
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Finally, many Europeans regularly follow what is now known as
the “Mediterranean” diet, which emphasizes plant-based foods, such
as fruits and vegetables, whole grains, legumes, and nuts. In a largescale randomized trial in which people were assigned to follow either
the Mediterranean diet or a low-fat diet, two important things emerged
(Estruch et al. 2013). First, the Mediterranean diet improved health and
longevity (versus the low-fat diet). Second, because our bodies seem to
be “wired” otherwise, people didn’t adhere to the low-fat diet, so the
study became a comparison of the Mediterranean diet versus a standard diet. The study had such large differences in the primary outcomes
of cardiac- or stroke-related death that the research was stopped early
because it became unethical to continue to forbid the low-fat group
from switching to the Mediterranean diet.

THE LONG-RUN “FIX”
Complicated problems seldom have simple solutions. The burdens
that our lifestyle choices place on our lives and our health care costs
cannot be solved with a magic bullet. However, there are some practical
ways to help fix these problems.
Focus on the Underlying Health Risks
To address the problem, we almost surely need a massive investment in public and private resources to find biologically based measures to help people alter their behaviors, most notably tobacco use and
poor food choices. Urging people to change their ways will not suffice. We have had modest success in reducing smoking through public
awareness, restricting smoking in public, higher taxes on cigarettes, and
more readily available smoking cessation products.
We have had far less success in reducing obesity. The epidemic
proportions of increasing obesity attest to this problem. So also do the
countless ads for weight-loss programs, some based on caloric control,
planned menus, diets low (or high) in carbohydrates, low-fat diets, balanced diets, and group support. Some products hint at effective weight
loss from various natural substances, usually with a warning such as
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“results not typical” next to the before and after photos of someone who
appears to have lost a lot of weight. Very few FDA-approved medications are available for weight loss. This highlights the problem: in order
to claim that a drug helps people lose weight, the FDA requires scientifically valid proof. Most weight-loss programs can’t sustain the losses
people achieve initially. Herbal and natural remedies are not subject
to FDA approval; thus, claims made about these diet aids are not as
controlled as are those for prescription drugs. The FDA has approved
several weight-loss drugs, one of which (by prescription) affects the
brain’s hunger signals. The first over-the-counter weight-loss drug was
approved in 2007 and works by blocking the body’s ability to absorb
fat. Therein lies the rub: what goes in must get burned or come out.
Those who take this drug and eat fatty foods often get a very sudden
reminder that they have recently consumed fat.7
For the dangerously obese (defined as having a BMI > 40), a relatively new approach called bariatric surgery shrinks or bypasses the
stomach so that the person feels full after eating less.8 This works well
for some people, but it has potential side effects such as acid reflux
(with overeating), nausea, and vomiting.
There is an old joke among economists: two economists are walking down the street, and one sees a $100 bill lying in the gutter. As he
leans over to pick it up, the other economist admonishes him, “If it
were a real $100 bill, somebody would have picked it up already.” Diet
aids are like that—if there were one that really worked and kept weight
off forever, it would dominate the market. Instead, we see herbs and
spices, various nonprescription drugs, acupressure and acupuncture,
group therapy, individual counseling, exercise programs, meditation,
prayer groups, and surgical interventions. Americans annually spend
$33 billion on weight-loss products, about $150 per adult per year, yet
we still gain weight (collectively) at an astonishing rate. The lack of
success provided by existing weight-control methods tells us that we
need something new.
Radically Restructure NIH Research Priorities
Managing the adverse health consequences (death, illness, injury,
pain, work loss, productivity loss) and associated medical costs of poor
lifestyle choices will require a massive investment in basic research to
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better understand the causes, treatments, and prevention of these key
addictive and behavioral choices—primarily tobacco and obesity, but
alcohol abuse as well. In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson declared war
on heart disease, cancer, and stroke, securing massive increases in funding through the various National Institutes of Health (NIH) to study the
causes and cures of these diseases. That effort has paid great dividends
in reductions of death and morbidity from these diseases. The funding
priorities of the NIH today show just how far behind we are on the
issues of tobacco and obesity. The NIH budget provides $30 billion
total for all NIH endeavors. Of this, $5 billion goes to the National Cancer Institute (NCI), $3 billion to the National Heart, Lung and Blood
Institute (NHLBI), and $1.6 billion for the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS), adding up to almost a third of
the NIH budget.
By contrast, NIH funding for the National Institute on Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism rests at $400 million. The National Institute on
Drug Abuse received $1 billion in funding in 2009. We have no national
institute to deal with tobacco addiction or obesity. Although some of the
NCI, NHLBI, and NINDS funds go toward prevention research, these
agencies’ research agendas are dominated with “cure” approaches.
I suggest that one of the best ways to reduce federal and private
health care spending over the next 50 years would be a massive investment in federal research to find effective ways to eliminate tobacco
use and excessive caloric intake (obesity). This cannot succeed if done
half-heartedly. In 2003 the NIH formed an obesity task force that has
published and regularly updated a strategic plan to deal with obesity.
It discusses cross-cutting research and emphasizes the need to deal
with behavioral modification, pharmacologic approaches, and surgical
approaches. Astonishingly, these reports have no mention of budgets.
Not a single word appears to suggest allocation of funds toward reducing obesity. Nobody is in charge. An old dictum (in a particularly inept
choice of metaphors in this case) says, “If you assign two people to feed
a dog, it will starve to death.” That is where the NIH is with obesity.
In 2000, one study looked at every grant issued by the NIH (across all
institutes) to estimate the research funding directly focused on tobacco
and nicotine use (Hughes and Liguori 2000). The 1995 total (their most
recent year of data) showed $92 million in dedicated research on this
issue, less than one-half of 1 percent of the NIH extramural budget.
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Therein sits the stark contrast: we spend about a third of the NIH budget on curing heart disease, cancer, and stroke, and we spend less than
half of 1 percent on prevention associated with tobacco use. Exactly
how much the NIH is currently devoting to obesity research remains
unknown, but the fact that its strategic plan for dealing with the problem
utters not a single word about budgetary commitment speaks volumes.
Improve K–12 Education
We have another important tool at our disposal—education. I don’t
mean provision of specific information about healthy lifestyles, but
rather general K–12 education and postsecondary education. According
to the most recent OECD data available (OECD 2015), while the United
States has increased in recent years in the percentage of the population with at least a high school diploma, it ranks 21 among the OECD
nations in student skills as measured by a standard international test.
And the higher the level of educational attainment one uses, the worse
the United States ranks—10th in having some postsecondary education
and 12th in a completed college degree. A major National Academy of
Sciences report (2007) highlights these issues. The report emphasizes
the role of education in the ability of the United States to compete economically in a world with rapidly expanding educational attainment in
many other countries, especially China and India (Phelps 2007). Here I
wish to emphasize a different issue—the role of education in changing
peoples’ lifestyle choices.
I present these data with a small caveat: we can readily observe
strong associations between educational attainment and healthy lifestyles. What we cannot know for sure is the ultimate cause. Using smoking as an example, we can be fairly sure that adult smoking habits do
not cause lower educational attainment earlier in life. We actually have
a decent amount of evidence showing that higher education actually
shifts people’s lifestyle choices. But there remains a third option—that
some unmeasured individual characteristic leads both to more education and improved lifestyle choices (Fuchs 1982). The most obvious
factor is differences in the time horizon people hold.9 Those with a long
time horizon will be more apt to invest in more education and also to
refrain from poor health habits that lead to poor health outcomes later
in life.
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My survey of that literature leads me to believe that education is
the causative factor. If true, then improving K–12 education will lead
people to acquire healthier lifestyles, which will in turn lead to fewer
chronic illnesses and lower the rate of growth of future health care
spending.
Education and Smoking
First, look at the simple relationship between smoking and educational attainment. No matter how it is measured, higher education is
closely linked to lower smoking rates. Figure 2.11 shows the smoking
participation rates (smoker vs. nonsmoker) by education.
Perhaps more importantly, Figure 2.11 shows how smoking rates
changed after publication of the U.S. surgeon general’s report on smoking (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1964). As FigFigure 2.11 Effects of Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking, by
Educational Attainment
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ure 2.7 shows, smoking rates began to plummet in 1965, but the change
did not occur equally across educational levels. As Figure 2.11 shows,
the rates of those with the least educational attainment changed very
little from 1965 onward. Those with the highest educational attainment
had the greatest change. Intermediate levels of education show correspondingly intermediate degrees of change in smoking rates.
This is powerful information: higher education, coupled with the
new information about the risks of smoking over time, led to far greater
reductions in smoking among the most highly educated than for others.
The operative mechanism seems to be that those with higher education
were able to better understand the new information about smoking risks
and incorporate that into their lifestyle choices.
Education and Obesity
We can see the same relationships between obesity (as measured
by BMI) and education. Figure 2.12 shows how educational attainment
and obesity relate. These data show a steady decline in obesity rates for
women (defined as ≥ 25) as educational attainment increases. For men,
the data show a slow upward trend in obesity rates until they obtain two
years of post–high school education and then strong declines in obesity
levels for those completing college and beyond. At all levels of education, obesity rates are higher for men than for women. For women, obesity rates for those who have a college education and above are about
half the rates for women with less than a high school education.
Education and Alcohol
As noted before, alcohol is a complicated drug, with some positive and some negative effects. These effects depend on both the type
of alcohol and the way it is consumed. Figure 2.13 shows that overall
drinking rates increase with educational attainment, seemingly in contrast to the overall patterns seen for smoking and obesity. But within
the finer detail of Figure 2.13 we can see that education reduces the
rates of alcohol abuse and binge drinking, the types of drinking that
lead to poorer health outcomes. Further, when we look at the beverage
of choice, higher education is linked to a much stronger preference for
wine and less preference for distilled spirits. So, the beverage of choice
(wines versus distilled spirits in particular) and the drinking patterns
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Figure 2.12 Obesity Rates by Educational Attainment
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(less binge drinking, less abusive drinking) lead us to the conclusion
that people with higher education have in fact made healthier lifestyle
choices.

CONCLUSION
Taking aim at our lifestyle choices represents only one of many
things we need to do to make our health care system efficient and successful. Many financial incentive problems exist that also need fixing,
beginning with the tax subsidy for employer-paid health insurance and
ending with major reforms in the structure of Medicare and Medicaid.
I address these elsewhere in Phelps (2010). The Affordable Care Act of
2010 fixed a few of the problems described in that book, exacerbated
others, and ignored most of the major issues. Moving from that legisla-
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Figure 2.13 Alcohol Use, by Educational Attainment
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tion to a system with good protection against financial risk while still
maintaining patient and provider incentives for efficient use of health
care resources is a subject too broad to cover in this chapter, but it is one
that will help define the economic future of the United States.

Notes
1. In economics jargon, the income elasticity is about 1.5, which (strangely to some
people) makes health care a “luxury good” by the usual definition—far from a
“necessity” or a “human right.”
2. Other factors also come into play, including income, cigarette prices, and even
wars. As the graph shows, smoking rises dramatically during wartime—that was
especially true during World War II, when the Red Cross (and others) gave cigarettes to soldiers.
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3. For imperial measurements, use weight in pounds, height in inches, and multiply
by 703 to correct for the differences between the measuring systems; thus, BMI =
703 × pounds/(inches × inches).
4. These data come from Calle et al. (1999), a large prospective study of all-cause
mortality and BMI. Many other studies exist on this topic; you can find one to give
almost any answer you want. For me, the prospective design of this study makes it
the gold standard. It began with a fixed group of people and followed their weights
and mortality outcomes over time.
5. Heavy drinking is commonly defined as more than 20 drinks per week. Binge
drinking has a variety of definitions, the most common being five drinks (four for
women) within a two-hour period.
6. The key ingredient appears to be procyanadin (see Corder [2007] for details). For
those who prefer to avoid alcohol, other foods with high levels of procyanadin
include chocolate, cranberry juice, pomegranates, and certain types of apples. It
seems that an apple a day may in fact keep the doctor away.
7. In computerese, we have “garbage in, garbage out.” Here we have “fat in, fat out.”
8. For example, to have a BMI of 40, a person measuring 5'6" would have to weigh
at least 247 pounds, and a person 6'0" would have to weigh at least 294 pounds.
9. Economists examine this issue by looking at the internal discount rate, the rate at
which things that occur in the future are valued less. Think about savings behavior
(as a simple investment) and the interest rate banks will pay you. If they pay 1
percent above inflation, you are not likely to save much, but if they pay 10 percent
above inflation, you will save much more. Time discounting works similarly (but
in the opposite direction)—those with a high discount rate save (or invest) less for
the future.
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3
Do Medical Care and SelfCare Compete or Complement
in Health Production?
Donald J. Meyer
Western Michigan University

Modern medical care is a major determinant of one’s health. Many
of us obtain better health from visiting a doctor when we are sick and,
when necessary, seeking diagnostic laboratory and imaging tests, medicine, hospital care, and outpatient surgery. Our own self-care is equally
important for maintaining good health, as are preventative measures we
take that either reduce the probability of sickness, illness, or accident or
lower the severity of the health event. Dow, Philipson, and Sala-I-Martin
(1999) cite the importance of both of these health inputs: “Resources
devoted to extending life may be interpreted not only as medical care
(e.g., hospital and physician services), but also as expenditures on
dietary needs, home care, physical exercise, or even time transfers from
children or spouses at old age” (p. 1360). The question of interest for
this chapter is, do people use these two factor types more in conjunction
with each other, or do they generally use one in place of the other?
One argument is that these two inputs are best used together—that
is, they are complementary. Becker (2007) examines health as a type
of human capital and looks at how it fits in with other forms of human
capital. To do this, he uses a survivor risk model of expected utility. The
uncertainty in the model refers to how long one lives or survives from
one period to the next. This survivorship probability depends on the
level of various health inputs, health shock events, and other factors.
He notes that the health field is full of complementarities such as that
between various diseases or health conditions. An increase in the probability of surviving one disease (due to one form of treatment) enhances
or raises the additional benefit from spending on other treatments to
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help survive other diseases. Becker also notes similar complementarities between health and education, between age levels, and between
health and the discount rate.
A second argument is that these two inputs are used in competition
with one another—that is, we tend to substitute one input for the other.
Consider someone who has been diagnosed with a high blood pressure
condition. This condition may be treated with better lifestyle habits,
such as losing weight, increasing regular exercise, and limiting sodium
intake, or with various types of prescribed blood pressure medications
and pills. If some medications are newly taken, do you respond by exercising less and eating more salt in your diet since the medicine is now
taking care of the condition? Or, consider someone who previously had
no health care or health insurance and now obtains it as a part of the
Affordable Care Act. Does this person rely more on the modern medical
care system to take care of his health needs and health level determination and thus worry less about maintaining a healthy lifestyle?
The United States spends more per capita on health care than any
other country. We have some of the most advanced health care technologies in the world. However, we have higher infant mortality rates and
a lower life expectancy rate than many other countries (Phelps 2010,
pp. 6–7). Additionally, we have one of the highest obesity rates in the
world, as well as low levels of exercise. How much are our lifestyle
choices linked to a substitution effect of experiencing newer and better
modern medical care? Can we take measures to reduce this offset effect
on health levels as new technological advances emerge?
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I
provide background information about good health modeling and present some traditional ideas about input substitution and complementarity. The third section argues the need to view demand and production
of health in a model of uncertainty. This uncertainty model framework
then gets applied to health with some important differences noted from
the basic model. I then examine the notion of modern care and self-care
being substitutes versus complements in this context. The section after
that examines three papers that contribute to this discussion, and the
final section offers concluding remarks.
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
As consumers, we often do not think regularly about production
functions and their related concepts. I envision here a health production
function, H = f (medical care, self-care, education, family genes, environment), for which the first two factors receive the focus or attention
in this chapter. We are more familiar, perhaps, with our preferences and
demand for the various goods and services that are in our utility functions. A common health formulation for utility is the function U = U
(H, Z), where utility depends on one’s health level, H, and the amount
consumed of a composite or a home-produced good Z. Health is an
interesting and challenging good to model in this way. As Grossman
(1972) notes in his seminal article, health is part consumption good
(we enjoy good health), part input into the production or purchase of
good Z, and part capital stock or durable good. H is a stock for which
the level increases through investment and deteriorates over time from
depreciation.
I do not go into the determination of selecting an optimal level of
H (and Z) to maximize utility in this chapter, but I do assume that the
consumer solves this maximization problem. A unique and important
feature about H is that it cannot be purchased in the marketplace; that
is, we cannot specialize in producing Z and then trade some of it for H.
Whatever H level we wish to consume must also be produced. This validates the importance of focusing on health production and the emphasis on the two inputs noted in the chapter and the relationship that exists
between them.
For a neoclassical, nonstochastic production function, there are two
traditional ways to classify two factors or inputs as substitutes, complements, or neither. One definition is to look at what happens to the marginal productivity of factor 2 when the decision maker uses a greater
level of input 1. Two factors are complements when an increase in factor
1 enhances the marginal productivity of factor 2. Two factors are substitutes when an increase in factor 1 reduces the marginal product of factor
2. Two factors are neither (or neutral) when the marginal productivity
of factor 2 has no relation to the level of input 1. So, ditch diggers and
shovels would be complements if the workers became more productive
moving dirt with a shovel than without. Grocery store checkers and
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self-scanning devices may be substitutes if the productivity of checkers
falls as self-scanning devices become available for grocery checkout.
A second definition involves what happens to the demand for factor
2 if the price of factor 1 were to increase. Two inputs are complements
when an increase in the price of factor 1 leads to a reduction in demand
for factor 2. Two factors are substitutes if an increase in the price of
factor 1 leads to an increase in demand for factor 2. So, looking at the
same two examples, ditch diggers and shovels are classified as complements because an increase in the price of ditch diggers would reduce the
demand for shovels. Grocery store checkers and self-scanners are classified as substitutes because an increase in the wage of checkers would
increase the demand for self-scanning devices.
Now let’s apply these definitions to health and self-care. If your
employer provides you with a subsidized health club and personal
trainer membership, then complementarity suggests that your health
insurance and medical care become more effective. Or, if you obtain
medical care through the Affordable Care Act, the substitution effect
suggests you would rely more on medical care and reduce your effort
with self-care. While this traditional pair of definitions is useful and
somewhat helpful in thinking about how medical care and self-care are
related, I argue next that we need to consider health production and
consumption in a context of uncertainty and model it as such. That is,
random health events, health losses, or disease outbreak must be considered to affect H along with the first two inputs and other factors
already considered.

UNCERTAINTY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTEXT
The process of attempting to attain one’s desired health stock is
subject to much randomness and uncertainty. Health losses are possible, owing to contracting any one of a number of debilitating diseases,
or suffering relapses during the recovery process. Automobile or other
types of accidents can drastically alter one’s health status in a matter
of moments. How one will respond to prescribed medical treatment
is never certain. Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990) note these sources
of health uncertainty and also the presence of imperfect information
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regarding assessment of either the effectiveness of medical care or of
one’s health level itself. Health decision making is subject to random
influences, and determination of possible outcomes and the associated
probabilities is certainly a subjective evaluation process. It is essential that the relation between modern health treatment and self-care be
examined within the context of this uncertain environment.
As I address some of the basics for decision making under uncertainty, I will highlight the ideas of risk and risk aversion, and also the
idea of turning to organized insurance markets as a way to shift risk
to a third party. I then examine self-care, where I refer to the ideas of
self-protection and self-insurance. I first review this material in general
and then apply it to our specific health setting, incorporating some of
the unique features of health. I will then summarize what is predicted or
known regarding the substitution or complementary nature of medical
care and self-care.
Consider the simple expected utility, additive formulation for a
risky setting: Wf = W0 + V − L, where Wf is final wealth, W0 is nonrandom initial wealth, V is the value of a risky asset, and L is random
loss associated with V. V could be one’s house, automobile, life or
earning potential, or one’s health stock. V is subject to losses, L, of
uncertain magnitude. Wealth at the end of the period reflects whatever
losses regarding L are incurred. It is generally assumed that one can
list all possible outcomes for L and the associated probabilities for all
the outcomes. For simplicity, it has often assumed that losses follow a
Bernoulli distribution; that is, have loss L1 with probability p or no loss
with probability 1− p.
How does one view facing this uncertain value for V? Risk aversion
is the norm, where risk aversion means a distaste or disutility for the
randomness one is facing. A risk-averse person is generally willing to
pay for a reduction in risk; this leads to a basic trade-off between risk
and return or income. Market insurance is a common way to shift risk
to an outside agent for a fee or payment.
The basic insurance contract has two main features: 1) the indemnity function, which describes what the insurance company will pay the
policy holder for various levels of L; and 2) the insurance payment or
premium. The premium paid directly depends not on the value of L but
on the expected value of L. Common forms for insurance policies are
deductible and coinsurance. The premium will depend on the deduct-
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ible or copay rate that is selected by the policy holder. Deductible insurance has the desirable feature of offering greater coverage for high-loss
values, but it offers less coverage when losses are small and easier to be
covered by the individual.
Insurance policies can offer larger or smaller levels of coverage.
Premiums reflect the level of protection that is selected in the policy.
The premium paid for a policy is generally equal to or larger than the
expected loss for L. A premium equal to the expected loss is said to be
“actuarially fair”—that is, the insurance company will break even on
average for such policies. The amount collected in premiums will just
cover what is paid out for losses on average. Premiums are often higher
than this break-even level to cover overhead and related costs of providing service. The fundamental theorem of insurance coverage states that
if offered insurance at an actuarially fair rate, all risk-averse persons
will choose full or 100 percent coverage.
Self-care measures can be taken in conjunction with market insurance or when formal insurance is not available in the marketplace. Selfinsurance refers to undertaking an expenditure that lowers the size of
L, and self-protection refers to undertaking an expenditure to lower
the probability of incurring a given loss. As Ehrlich and Becker (1972)
note, some self-care choices fall in the self-insurance category, some
are of the self-protection variety, and some have aspects of both types.
Common examples of self-insurance are installing fire sprinklers to
guard against fire damage, using sturdier building materials in earthquake- and hurricane-prone areas, and installing a tracking device in
a car to make recovery easier when stolen. Self-protection measures
include installing home security protection to help keep burglars out,
efforts to reduce the probability of a terrorist attack, or using a steering
wheel locking device to reduce the chance of theft. Ehrlich and Becker
suggest that a talented lawyer serves to reduce both the chance of a
criminal conviction and possibly the severity of the sentencing.
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) is a highly cited article and is foundational in the self-care literature. The authors look at the market insurance option as a means of risk reduction along with the ideas of selfinsurance and self-protection. They suggest that when addressing the
need to limit one’s risk position, one should look at all three of these
together, as each serves to deal with loss reduction or loss likelihood in
one fashion or another. They also note that both market insurance and
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self-insurance work to shift income toward the loss state and hence tend
to be substitutes for each other.
Self-protection, on the other hand, reduces income in both the loss
and no-loss state by the cost of the activity, offering the benefit of reducing the probability of the negative event. It is considerably more complex in its effect on the risk problem and offers less clear-cut results or
findings. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) find that self-protection and market
insurance tend to be complementary in nature rather than substitutes,
with the strength of the complementarity depending on market conditions. Many others have followed up this initial work with a focus on
self-protection, owing to its more challenging nature and complexity.
Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) explore the relationship between
increasing risk aversion and self-insurance and self-protection. The
first idea is expected: as people become more risk averse, their level of
self-insurance increases. However, the authors find that self-protection
is not monotonically related to the level of risk aversion. They look for
conditions that would allow more precise findings about how increased
risk aversion and self-protection are related, but few clean and intuitive
results were able to be reached. They did look at the relation for two
specific utility preferences: a quadratic utility maximizer and a logarithmic utility function. For two logarithmic expected utility maximizers
with different levels of risk aversion, they find that the more risk-averse
person actually chose less self-protection.
Briys and Schlesinger (1990) build on these two papers and look
further at risk aversion and self-protection and self-insurance. They
broaden the known results for self-insurance by showing that under
state-dependent utility and in the presence of background risk, selfinsurance and risk aversion continue to be directly related. The authors
make the revealing observation that self-protection can be broken down
into a combination of a mean-preserving spread and a mean-preserving
contraction. The spread occurs at a lower level of the decision maker’s
income, and the contraction takes place at a higher income level.
Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) apply a different uncertainty concept,
prudence, to the analysis of self-protection. Prudence, which exists
when the third derivative of the utility function is positive, differentiates between the risk occurring in the upper versus lower end of the
income distribution. The authors show that prudence, as well as the
probability of the loss being closer to unity versus closer to zero, is cru-
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cial in self-protection determination. Meyer and Meyer (2011) further
clarify with additional analysis the role that prudence plays for selfprotection. Their findings hinge on the size of the risk increase (in the
lower end of income distribution) versus the size of the risk decrease
(in the upper end of income distribution). Meyer and Meyer’s results
use a risk technique introduced by Diamond and Sitglitz (1974), which
considerably simplifies the analysis and allows for generalization. For
example, the loss distribution was allowed to be more general and not
required to follow the often-assumed Bernoulli distribution.
Finally, Snow (2011) looks at self-protection and self-insurance
from a nonexpected utility framework. He integrates the concept of
ambiguity and ambiguity aversion to his analysis of self-care. Ambiguity exists when there is uncertainty about the probability of the loss
occurring. In the expected utility model, the probabilities concerning
losses are assumed to be known with certainty. He shows that optimal
levels of self-protection and self-insurance are higher in the presence of
ambiguity (than with none) or when people are more ambiguity averse.
A significant difference between Snow’s and much of the prior results is
that his findings are similar for both self-protection and self-insurance,
rather than differing considerably in the literature that uses expected
utility formulation.
So what does decision making under uncertainty—in particular,
market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection—have to do with
the relationship between modern medical care and self-care in the health
setting? The answer lies in considering how these concepts apply to the
analysis of making decisions under health uncertainty. The particular
manner in which health markets function turns out to be critical in this
discussion. First, it is important to recognize the close link between
health insurance and modern medical care. The typical health insurance
policy covers a large number of medical health care items and procedures. Health insurance is essentially prepaid medical care, as it covers
most of your medical expenses. Unlike other forms of insurance, you
do not receive monetary payment from the insurance company based
on the health loss that you have experienced. Instead, you seek medical
treatment for your health issue, and then insurance pays much of these
medical bills. Self-care undertakings and efforts are typically not covered by one’s health insurance. Self-protection and self-insurance strategies undertaken on an individual level are paid for by the individual.
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Approximately 50 percent of U.S. residents receive health insurance and medical care through their employers. The roots for this program go back to the 1940s, when firms, which were facing both wage
controls and a shortage of workers in World War II, started offering
health insurance as a nontaxable employee benefit. The idea was positively received by workers and has become integrated as part of our
national health care system. Even so, a sizable percentage of Americans
have had to do without health insurance. The Affordable Care Act is
working to reduce this number, as those who previously had no health
insurance are able to obtain it through their state health exchange system or through the Medicaid expansions.
As an example of a typical health insurance policy and the medical
care that is covered, I will examine the policy that I have at Western
Michigan University. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan provides a
Preferred Provider Organization policy for university employees. This
type of policy allows one to seek medical care from any provider desired
but offers a financial incentive to seek treatment from a provider who is
part of the network or system. My policy covers most types of medical
care, including primary or specialist care visits, diagnostic or imaging
tests, prescription drugs, outpatient center and surgeon services, emergency and urgent care treatment, and hospital care. The policy carefully
gives all the deductibles and copays that must be paid in the different
situations. Some medical treatments, such as acupuncture, cosmetic
surgery, and weight loss programs, are not covered by the policy.
Several features of health insurance work to reinforce this close tie
between insurance and medical care. First, health insurance typically
covers routine medical care, such as a doctor’s visit or an antibiotics
prescription. Most other forms of insurance are more of a “catastrophic
coverage” nature only and do not cover the routine expenditures. Second, the monetary indemnity payment received from non-health types
of insurance policies is based on the loss that is experienced regarding
your risky asset. Money payment is sent directly to the person who
experiences roof hail damage, based on an independent assessment of
the damage. For health insurance, no such money payment is received;
rather, the health care provider receives payment for health services
rendered in treating the health condition. Lastly, the insurance relation,
in reality, is between the insurance company and the health care provider—in most loss instances the patient has little direct involvement in
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the exchange. All of these serve to strengthen the connection between
health insurance and modern medical care.
Second, self-care in the health setting—self-protection and selfinsurance—is reflected mainly in wise lifestyle choices that involve eating, exercise, tobacco and alcohol usage, and stress management. Sticking to a healthy diet and controlling one’s weight reduces the chances
of coronary disease due to high blood pressure or of developing type
II diabetes. By exercising and keeping fit, one lowers the chances of
developing any number of negative health issues and also enhances
recovery when illness develops or surgery is required. Overuse of alcohol or tobacco products has negative effects on your health, and such
products should be eliminated or used in moderation. Wise lifestyle
choices can both reduce the likelihood of a bad health event and reduce
the loss if such an event does occur.
The primary question of interest for this chapter is whether medical
care and lifestyle choices (self-care) are more of a complementary or
substitution type of relationship. The purpose of this section has been
to prove that this must be examined within a risk and uncertainty context using the related concepts of market insurance, self-protection, and
self-insurance. This leads to a much richer and more relevant definition
of substitutes and complements in production of health than the simple
neoclassical production formulation discussed earlier.
So, where do I stand on this question? It remains an empirical
issue—both the substitution and complementarity effects are legitimate
and are possible in every situation; the size of each effect will depend on
the particular setting one is in and in how medical or self-care is being
measured. Both types of care are broad concepts, there is not likely to
be just a single relationship between them. Substitution between medical care and self-care is a strong force and is more likely to be readily
apparent. Complementarity is more subtle and will likely be more difficult to observe, and its statistical significance is less clear. As Dow,
Philipson, and Sala-I-Martin (1999) note, “Although complementarity
induced by competing risks applies very generally, the important question for evaluating public health programs is whether its empirical magnitude is significant” (p. 1359).
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A REVIEW OF THREE EMPIRICAL PAPERS
In this section I review three papers that focus on the relationship
between some aspect of the modern medical care system together with
different features of self-care. The first paper looks at implementation
in developing countries of the Expanded Programme on Immunization
(EPI) of the United Nations. The expected immunization of children
against the six deadliest childhood diseases caused mothers to take better care of their children in general, which supports the complementarity effect. The next paper examines the effect Medicare had on the
health behaviors of new Medicare enrollees in the United States. The
authors find evidence of ex ante moral hazard, or the substitution effect
of those receiving Medicare taking less good care of their health. The
final paper discusses the effect that statin drugs, which are very successful in treating high cholesterol and heart disease, have on the lifestyle
choices of those using the statins. Strong evidence for substitution is
noted, as people may feel able to get away with a less healthy lifestyle
given they have this “get out of jail free card.” Some positive, though
more uneven, evidence of significant complementarity was also found.
Dow, Philipson, and Sala-I-Martin (1999) examine household data
for four African countries—Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—for children who are expected to receive vaccinations for measles, neonatal tetanus, polio, whooping cough, diphtheria, and tuberculosis. The authors hypothesize that women will seek better nutrition and
other health inputs when they believe that their children will be inoculated against these potentially fatal childhood diseases. The researchers
use birth weight as the indicator of maternal care.
Using data on the children, ordinary least squares estimates are first
calculated, followed by estimates from present family fixed effects and
lagged instrumental fixed effects models, owing to concern for possible
unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Other safeguards and robustness
checks are implemented as well. The authors consistently find complementarity between the care taken by mothers and the expected vaccinations against the diseases.
Dow, Philipson, and Sala-I-Martin (1999) argue for the significance
of these complementarity effects in health mortalities programs, such as
the EPI in developing countries. Treatment for one set of diseases has
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positive spillover effects on the mortality rates of other health issues.
If one were to consider the marginal benefit and marginal costs of the
treatment or programs in isolation from each other, then erroneous conclusions would be reached regarding implementation levels of these
treatments. For this particular health setting or environment, it seems
that complementarity is evident, real, and sizable, and it needs to be
incorporated into the health analysis.
Dave and Kaestner (2009) find strong evidence of substitution away
from healthy lifestyle choice in response to new availability and lower
costs of medical provisions from Medicare. They identify direct or ex
ante moral hazard effect in conjunction with a secondary indirect effect.
This so-called doctor effect is because increased physician contact from
Medicare alters information concerning the benefits of self-care leading
to better lifestyle choices. Dave and Kaestner estimate both of these
countervailing effects and in general find significance for both.
The authors look at three lifestyle choice behaviors separately for
both males and females—exercise, smoking, and alcohol use. Results
for men are largely statistically significant and show that Medicare led
to a worsening of healthy lifestyle choices. For the sample of males the
authors find a decrease in the probability of vigorous physical exercise, higher prevalence of daily smoking along with increased cigarette
consumption, and an increase in probable alcohol use, including daily.
The same estimates for women are generally statistically insignificant,
although Medicare is generally associated with a worsening of lifestyle
choices.
Kaestner, Darden, and Lakdawalla (2014) search for both substitution and complementarity effects on lifestyle choice variables due to
statin drug use. Statins have been shown to significantly reduce cardiovascular disease and health complications due to high cholesterol.
One may be tempted to forgo costly lifestyle choices known to combat
high cholesterol and related issues while on a statin prescription. The
complementarity effect, on the other hand, suggests that if statin use
decreases the problems related to heart disease, one has an increased
incentive to make healthier choices that reduce the mortality from other
diseases.
The substitution effect is seen by an increase in the body mass index
and the likelihood of being obese, an increase in moderate alcohol use
by men, and a decrease in exercise rates for women. The authors also

Do Medical Care and Self-Care Compete or Complement? 47

find some evidence of complementarity, however, in the form of higher
physical activity for males and greater use of preventative medicines,
such as blood pressure medication and aspirin, for both genders.
Furthermore, Kaestner, Darden, and Lakdawalla (2014) write,
“There is a general concern that statin use may adversely affect health
behaviors that substitute for pharmaceutical treatment of hyperlipidemia. If there is substitution of statins for a healthy lifestyle, then the
efficacy of statin use may be compromised and statin use may result in
a greater incidence of disease that is unrelated to cholesterol, but associated with a healthy lifestyle (diet and exercise)” (p. 162).

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
There is a need for additional empirical work that looks for the possible presence and magnitude of both the substitution and complementarity effects as we continue to gather evidence and sort out the connection between medical care and self-care. Abrokwah, Callison, and
Meyer (2015) examine the rollout of nationalized health care in Ghana
in 2004. Tentatively, after the rollout they not only find evidence for the
substitution toward medical care away from alternative or traditional
care but also observe complementarity between some specific forms of
alternative or traditional care and medical care.
Furthermore, as already noted, complementarities create spillover
effects due to competing risks in the survival model. As Dow, Philipson, and Sala-I-Martin (1999) suggest, the marginal benefit of investing
in lowering the mortality rate for one disease can increase as the survival rates for other diseases or health conditions increase. The decision
maker needs to recognize the private benefit from this positive externality when selecting his or her optimal mix of health inputs. Incorporating
this on an individual basis will strengthen health as a positive externality for overall society as well. Every one of us benefits as a larger percentage of people seek and reach good health status. On the flip side,
the negative externalities resulting from obesity, excessive spending in
the last few months of life, and poor lifestyle can affect everyone, too.
To more fully benefit from these positive spillovers, measures could
be taken that support or subsidize the complementarity between inputs
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and that limit excessive substitution between the inputs. For example,
through various forms of media or advertising, people can be encouraged to prepare healthy meals or to engage in exercise. Visually portraying a group of bicyclists or runners laughing and having a good time
or showing a family having quality time preparing and eating a meal
together can strengthen the positive consumption feature that good
health provides. This would not only increase health levels of individuals, but on a larger scale could also help reduce our excessive health
spending and increase our national health performance measures.
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4
Payment Reform
and “Bending the Curve”
John H. Goddeeris
Michigan State University
“It’s important for us to bend the cost curve . . . because the system
we have right now is unsustainable . . .”
—President Barack Obama, Washington Post, July 22, 2009

WHAT CURVE AND WHY BEND IT?
The need to “bend the curve” is a constant refrain in discussions
of health care policy. President Obama emphasized it as one of his two
major objectives in promoting health care reform, the other being to
greatly increase the number of insured. Numerous academic studies,
newspaper articles, and blog posts have debated whether the Affordable Care Act (ACA) will succeed in bending the curve and discussed
additional steps that could help. Everyone seems to agree that bending
the curve is something we must do.
So, what is this curve that everyone wants to bend? Those who use
the expression are not always explicit about what they mean, but one
possibility is the curve showing the time trend of the share of gross
domestic product (GDP) devoted to health care, as in Figure 4.1. This
curve is not exactly smooth, especially over the last two decades, but
the long-term trend is upward, with national health expenditures rising
from 5.2 percent of GDP in 1960 to 17.5 percent in 2014. Clearly there
is some indication that this curve has already been bent, as the share
of GDP has been essentially flat since 2009. Nonetheless, government
forecasters still expect the share to rise to 19.6 percent by 2024 (Keehan
et al. 2015).
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Figure 4.1 Health Care as a Percent of GDP (through 2014)
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

It may seem obvious that we should want to see a permanent plateau
in the curve in Figure 4.1, but not everyone would agree. Economists
Robert Hall and Charles Jones (2007) have argued that as our standard
of living improves (they expect, perhaps optimistically, a return to more
traditional levels of economic growth), it is perfectly natural that we
would devote a larger share of our resources to longer lives and better
health. According to their models, 30 percent of GDP devoted to health
by 2050 may be just what we want.
Given the nature of our political system, the curve that may need to
be bent more urgently concerns the part of health care spending financed
through government. Although the United States arguably has the lowest level of government involvement in its health care system among
advanced countries, our government’s share of total health spending
was already at 47 percent in 2013.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has for a number of years
warned about the challenge that health care spending growth poses for
the federal government. Figure 4.2 shows recent trends and projections
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as of June 2015 of federal spending (excluding interest on the debt) separated into components, assuming current law remains in place (CBO
2015). While the recent slowdown in the growth of health spending
has had a favorable impact on the budget, the figure shows that major
health programs are still projected to claim a larger share of GDP over
time, growing at a faster rate than Social Security. The projected decline
relative to the economy of other noninterest spending, which includes
national defense, may also prove difficult to accomplish.
Furthermore, over the long run, while population aging and the
expansion of coverage under health care reform are also important
factors, much of the growth of federal health care spending is about
increases in spending on a per beneficiary basis, what the CBO calls
“excess cost growth.” Projecting out to the year 2040, the CBO attributes 45 percent of the growth of major health programs relative to
GDP to excess cost growth (CBO 2015, p. 25).1
One response to these projections, in line with the Hall and Jones
(2007) findings, is that if they prove to be correct we must simply find
Figure 4.2 Trends in Components of Federal Spending as a Percent
of GDP
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the necessary revenue, because we place a high and increasing value
on the improvements in health made possible by rising health spending. Such a response seems to underplay the political difficulties of significantly increasing the share of GDP taken in taxes, as well as the
competing pressures to increase other forms of spending, such as on
defense, homeland security, education, and infrastructure.
In addition, there is a widely shared view that we are not getting
enough from the resources we currently devote to health care—that we
ought to be able to slow the growth of health spending without significant sacrifice. The United States spends far and away the largest share
of GDP on health care of any country, yet it lags behind other advanced
countries in such health indicators as life expectancy and infant mortality. Researchers at Dartmouth College and others have also found large
differences in health spending per capita by region within the United
States that are difficult to explain, and little or no indication that higherspending regions achieve superior outcomes by spending more (Fisher
et al. 2003a,b).
Understanding all the reasons for international and interregional
differences is challenging and remains an active area of research.
Nonetheless, in light of political realities and our budgetary situation, it
seems safe to conclude that one way or another, the growth of per capita
spending on health care will be bent downward relative to its long-run
trend.
This chapter is not about predicting how we will reduce the growth
of health care spending, nor is it an argument for a single magic solution that we should adopt to eliminate the problem. Reducing spending growth in a sensible way will surely involve a number of different
strategies. I will focus on something I and many others think is one
important component of the appropriate solution: changing the way that
providers of health care are paid. More specifically, I will argue that
we should move away from payment on a fee-for-service basis toward
more “global” payment methods, paying provider organizations riskadjusted but largely prospectively set amounts per enrollee.
Medicare is a leader in pursuing this sort of payment reform, through
its experimentation with accountable care organizations (ACOs). Given
Medicare’s involvement as a government program, it is interesting to
ask whether a movement toward global payment inevitably leads to
a more highly regulated or even single-payer health care system, or
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whether it can be a step toward a more effective market-based system
with a stronger role for competition and consumer choice. The issues
get rather complex, but as I will discuss, I am somewhat optimistic that
competition among ACOs (and other sorts of health insurance arrangements) is possible, and is indeed the most promising approach to making the market work better.
Bending the cost curve will continue to be very challenging. At the
end of the chapter, I briefly discuss one issue I believe we will need to
confront. Even if a well-designed competitive system is successful at
eliminating truly wasteful spending, keeping the growth of spending at
an acceptable level will require that we recognize and accept that not
all care that offers any benefit, regardless of cost, should be provided.

BACKGROUND: HEALTH CARE MARKETS AND
FEE-FOR-SERVICE
As a general rule, markets work well when consumers are freely
spending their own money and can reasonably judge the quality of
what they are buying. In that setting, producers compete to produce the
things that consumers want, and to survive they must sell them at the
lowest sustainable prices. A perennial question in health care economics is whether health care is different from other forms of economic
activity in ways that have important implications for how well markets
can work.
Early on, Kenneth Arrow (1963) clarified some of the most important peculiarities of health care markets, arising from the unpredictability of medical needs and the imbalance of technical knowledge between
providers and consumers of care. Perhaps the most fundamental impediment to a textbook competitive market is that consumers want to be
insulated from financial considerations when they are making decisions about health care for themselves or their loved ones, especially
when the stakes are high and the circumstances are already stressful. In
part this is ordinary risk aversion—a willingness to pay something (an
insurance premium) to be protected from uncertain but potentially large
bills that could arise from circumstances beyond one’s control. But it
is also a reflection of the conditions under which health care decisions
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are often made. It is perfectly rational, for example, to not want to think
about money when making decisions about a spouse with cancer. As a
result, while there can be an important role for consumer choice and
consumer incentives in health care, consumers cannot be expected to
constrain wasteful spending at the point of service in the same way they
do in other markets.
While the rise of managed care in the 1990s promoted experimentation with different methods of payment to health care providers, fee-forservice remains the predominant way that they are paid. Alternatives to
fee-for-service are most likely to be used by health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which cover a relatively small share of the population. For example, in 2015 only about 20 percent of Medicare enrollees
were covered by HMOs (Jacobson et al. 2015). Among workers with
employer-sponsored insurance, only 24 percent were in either HMOs or
related but less restrictive point-of-service plans (Claxton et al. 2015).
And even HMOs often use fee-for-service methods to pay providers.
Fee-for-service is the way we pay most other service providers that
we deal with, be they lawyers, plumbers, or hairdressers, so why is it
a problem in health care? A key difference with health care is that we
are typically not the ones paying at the point of service, or we are paying only a small fraction of the total bill. Our doctors have a financial
incentive to recommend more services as long as payment exceeds the
marginal cost of production, and if we are insured we have little or no
financial incentive to question their advice.
Other issues might have more to do with the way fee-for-service
medicine is currently practiced and administered than with the method
itself. Spending time with patients to evaluate their needs, counsel them
about making lifestyle changes, or coordinate care among other doctors
is generally not as well rewarded as running tests and performing procedures. Some valuable services are often not remunerated at all, such
as a doctor communicating with a patient by phone or e-mail, or a nurse
talking to a pharmacist about a patient’s medications.
Perhaps we don’t need to abandon fee-for-service, we just need to
fix it, to pay for the right things at the right rates. But what would an
ideal fee-for-service system look like? Congress and Medicare administrators devoted a lot of effort to answering that question back in the
1980s, when they worked to create a more rational system of payments
to physicians. They commissioned a major study at Harvard University
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(Hsiao et al. 1988) that arrived at the Resource Based Relative Value
Scale (RBRVS), which was implemented in the early 1990s and, with
modifications, is still in use today (Ginsburg 2012). The intent of the
RBRVS is that payments for services be proportionate to the costs of
producing them. The goal seems to be to create an environment that
is “neutral” with regard to incentives, to let physicians’ decisions be
guided by clinical considerations rather than economic ones.
But the “cost” of a service is by no means unambiguously defined
or easily measured. For example, for services that require equipment
with high fixed costs, such as magnetic resonance imaging exams, the
average cost per unit of service depends heavily on the volume of services, and average cost may diverge considerably from the economically relevant marginal cost. What cost should we be trying to match
in setting a payment rate? The minimum average cost achieved by a
provider operating at optimum capacity is one possible target (assuming we can determine what it is), but paying only that much might also
undesirably limit patient access in geographic areas that cannot support
the volume of services necessary to bring costs down to that level.2
Paying more creates a profit opportunity that can lead to excessive use.
To take another quite simple example, what is the cost of sending an
e-mail to a patient? An e-mail requires some time and effort, which
represents a real cost, but the amount of effort is hardly uniform across
messages. Any flat rate per e-mail would leave payment unrelated to the
effort expended.
Those involved with RBRVS know that it is difficult technically—
and politically—to set payments in a neutral way (Ginsburg 2012). For
example, the apparent bias in the payment system toward procedures
and away from evaluation and management services—an issue that the
RBRVS was intended to address from the beginning—remains a concern. I submit that in any fee-for-service system there will inevitably
be services that are profitable at the margin and therefore encouraged,
and other valuable services that cost more than they return in payment.
Furthermore, even if we could be neutral, a fee-for-service system
has other shortcomings. If doctors can expect to be paid the reasonable
cost of whatever services they provide, they have no positive financial
incentive to maintain and improve the patient’s health in the least costly
way. When they are being paid for each service and the patient is not
paying directly, they have no incentive to avoid costly but very low
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(or even zero) benefit care. One of the things that many doctors may
like about fee-for-service is that it allows them to act as independent
practitioners and doesn’t require them to collaborate too closely with
anyone else, but that is really a weakness from a social perspective. It
is difficult to create incentives for collaboration under fee-for-service.
In a New York Times article, Bogdanich and McGinty (2011) provide an instructive example. When a patient undergoes a chest CT scan,
it is very common for some hospitals to perform two scans consecutively, one without dye and the other with dye injected for contrast into
the patient’s veins. Radiologists say there is very rarely a clinical reason
for doing consecutive scans, but in some hospitals when a chest scan
is done, a second one follows more than 80 percent of the time. The
aggregate amounts of money involved make this example almost trivial
in the big picture of health care spending, and the extra payment may
not have been the primary motivation for doing the second scan, but
fee-for-service payment certainly does not discourage the practice. Of
greater concern in this instance is that performing a second CT scan
exposes the patient to additional radiation.
Fee-for-service payment systems can be made more rational, and
government and private payers seek to do that all the time. Extra payments or penalties can be added for meeting or not meeting certain performance goals. Guidelines can be written that define the conditions
under which particular services are reimbursable. Major capital investments can be subject to regulatory approval. But this also illustrates part
of the problem with fee-for-service. Because of the perverse financial
incentives that it creates, it requires these sorts of additional regulations—or one might say, micromanagement by payers—if spending
growth is to be limited.

PAY FOR OUTPUT, NOT INPUT: BUNDLING
To an economist, the things that are reimbursed under a fee-forservice system—the well-baby visit, the flu shot, the MRI, or even the
surgical repair of a damaged knee—are more like inputs than outputs.
Individuals care about maintaining and improving health, and health
care services are a means to that end. If it is possible to identify and pay
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more directly for outputs, then it seems preferable to do that. Paying for
output appropriately should then make it possible to leave the decisions
about inputs to the knowledgeable professionals and limit the amount
of bureaucratic interference.
The principle of paying for output rather than input makes sense,
but there are plenty of practical complications. A fundamental question
is, what output should we pay for? One important idea that I will touch
on only briefly is bundling by episode of care (Komisar, Feder, and
Ginsburg 2011), which goes beyond payments for individual services
to make a single payment for a package of care. Limited forms of bundling are already common in our system. For example, the diagnosisrelated group payment system for inpatient hospital care that Medicare
began using in the 1980s makes a single payment to a hospital for an
admission based on the patient’s diagnosis. Making a single payment to
an obstetrician to cover prenatal care, delivery, and postpartum care is
another kind of bundle. These examples stop short of bringing all providers of care (such as physicians and hospitals) into the same bundle,
so they do not create incentives for collaboration across providers or
for combining all the elements of care in an efficient way, as a more
inclusive bundle might do.
One key issue with bundling is how to define an episode. Medicare is in the early stages of an initiative mandated by the Affordable
Care Act called Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI). For
the most part, BPCI defines episodes around certain types of inpatient
admissions. It is working with several different bundling models, but
some go well beyond the diagnosis-related group hospital payment system, in a positive direction, by defining the episode to begin prior to
hospitalization and to extend for a period of time afterward, and by
including all types of care in the same bundled payment (Cassidy 2015).
Some of the basic questions about bundling, such as how to deal
with differences in severity across patients and how to reward quality
of care, arise also with more global payment, which I will discuss next.
For now I will suggest three reasons why bundling by episode seems
less than ideal as the predominant way of paying for care. First, not all
care can be readily grouped into episodes. Analyzing Medicare data,
Cutler and Ghosh (2012) find that even if every inpatient stay and the
outpatient services related to it are classified as part of an episode, only
a little over half of program spending can be accounted for. A second
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and related point is that episode-based payment does not by itself create
incentives to keep patients healthy so that episodes are avoided. Indeed,
it may create financial incentives to organize care—or at least the way
that care is reported—so as to increase the number of episodes. Third,
if we wish to have a system in which incentives to optimize quality and
cost are generated through the exercise of consumer choice, as in more
standard market settings, episode-based payment may not be the best
way to do so.3

COMPREHENSIVE CARE AS THE BASIS FOR PAYMENT
Good health is the output that we ultimately care about the most.
We want the best care when episodes of ill health happen, but preventing them would be even better. Therefore, we might contemplate going
beyond payment for episodes of care and consider making a single payment to an organization responsible for all of an individual’s care.
This idea of paying health care organizations on a “capitation”
basis, a fixed amount per person covered, is not new. Early examples of
“prepaid group practice” in the United States go all the way back to the
1930s, and the most successful one developed into Kaiser Permanente,
a health plan that today has more than 10 million enrollees nationwide.
During the 1990s, payers and providers experimented rather extensively
with capitation as a basis for payment, but a backlash against managed
care led to a decline in its use in favor of a return to fee-for-service.
The backlash came from both consumers and doctors. For consumers, the big concern is that if providers incur costs but gain no additional revenue by providing more services, then they have an incentive
to skimp on quality and to withhold costly but valuable care. For doctors, the main concerns depend on whether it is they, either individually
or in groups, who are accepting capitation payments. If they are, then
they may be taking on a great deal of risk for things that are beyond
their control. What happens if a doctor enrolls a set of patients and an
unusual fraction of them suffer costly illnesses or injuries despite the
doctor’s best efforts? Then the aggregate payment, which was expected
to be adequate under normal circumstances, will not be sufficient to
cover the cost of care.
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With a large enough group of enrollees who are representative of
the population from which they are drawn, the more or less random
events that lead some people to incur high medical expenditures and
others low can be expected to average out. Indeed, the ability to pool
risks in a large population is what makes it possible for an insurance
company to offer coverage at a price that people are willing to pay,
without the insurance company itself being subject to excessive risk.
But the population of patients that a single doctor, or even a group of
doctors, is capable of serving may not be large enough to reduce the risk
to an acceptable level.
Doctors and groups of doctors are understandably reluctant to
accept capitation payment, especially full capitation, which makes
them responsible for all the costs of a patient’s care. If they work with
an HMO or other organization that is itself accepting capitation payment and pays the doctors using fee-for-service, their concern becomes
one of excessive pressure or interference from the HMO to limit costs.
The Accountable Care Organization Idea
Capitation remains a dirty word among many health care providers,
and for many consumers the title HMO has negative connotations. A
somewhat different idea and a new term has emerged among those who
want to see providers accept responsibility for comprehensive care for
defined populations. The title “Accountable Care Organization” (ACO)
even made its way into the language of the Affordable Care Act.4
Section 3022 of the ACA discusses a Medicare Shared Savings
Program that “promotes accountability for a patient population and coordinates items and services under parts A and B, and encourages investment in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for high quality
and efficient service delivery.” The act goes on to say that “groups of
providers of services and suppliers . . . may work together to manage and
coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries through an
accountable care organization.” In 2015, 424 groups were participating
as Medicare ACOs serving over 7.8 million beneficiaries (Cavanaugh
2014).
Advocates of ACOs take great pains to differentiate the concept
from other forms of capitation payment. Four factors make ACOs different, based on the way Medicare is implementing the idea: 1) an ACO
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is usually an organization created and run by health care providers—no
insurer middleman must come between Medicare and the clinicians or
between the clinicians and enrollees; 2) payment involves the central
idea of shared savings, which means that it is not in fact entirely fixed
prospectively; 3) the amount of payment also depends on hitting certain
quality targets; and 4) the Medicare enrollees linked to an ACO retain
free choice of provider—they are not limited to receiving services from
providers who are part of that ACO.
Many aspects of how Medicare’s model of ACOs works are discussed elsewhere in more detail (for example, Berenson and Burton
[2011]). I will focus on only a few points here, and in a somewhat simplified way. As noted above, an ACO participating with Medicare agrees
to be accountable for the care of a population of Medicare enrollees. In
the current model, enrollees do not actively choose an ACO but rather
may be linked to one based on where they get their primary care. If
the doctor providing the largest dollar amount of a particular enrollee’s
primary care (based on fee-for-service billings) is part of an ACO, then
that enrollee is linked to that ACO.
The idea of shared savings warrants further explanation. Medicare
sets a target amount of payment for the population covered by the ACO,
but it actually continues to pay the ACO on a fee-for-service basis. The
“savings” is the difference between the target and the total fee-forservice payments. Mathematically, a simple form of this system would
look like this:
(4.1)

R = TOTFFS + α × (TAR – TOTFFS),

where R is total revenue for the ACO, TOTFFS represents total fee-forservice payments, TAR is the target, and α is the “sharing rate.” Note
that in this formula the savings could be negative—if the fee-for-service
billings exceeded the target—in which case the ACO would need to pay
back a share (α) of the payments in excess of the target.5
Equation (4.1) may be rewritten as
(4.2)

R = α × TAR + (1 − α) × TOTFFS ,

which shows that this payment mechanism is actually a combination
of capitation and fee-for-service for values of α between 0 and 1. At
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one extreme (α = 1) it is pure capitation, at the other (α = 0) it is pure
fee-for-service.
The hope, of course, is that the possibility of receiving shared savings will motivate the decision makers in the ACO to be more responsible for the costs of care, and to do things to reorganize care to reduce
costs while maintaining or improving quality. So how is the decision
about prescribing a particular service different in an ACO than as a feefor-service practitioner? Under fee-for-service, the marginal financial
gain or loss for providing a service is the difference between the fee and
the marginal cost (MC) of providing the service, or simply
(4.3)

Fee − MC.

As long as this expression is positive there is a financial incentive
to provide the service. Things become more complicated in an ACO.
There is still the fee, and the marginal cost is still incurred, but a share of
the fee is taken back, and then there may be indirect effects. If providing
better preventive care keeps a patient out of the hospital, for example,
it reduces other costs that the organization would have incurred, but it
also reduces fees that would have been earned on those other services.
We can amend Expression (4.3) to read
(4.4)

Fee − MC − α × Fee + indirect effects,

recognizing that the indirect effects can themselves be complicated. If
α is large (close to 1), then the fee for the service and for any services
indirectly affected becomes less important, and financial incentives
are more about direct costs of a service relative to costs that might be
avoided by providing it, as would be the case in a true capitated system.
An ACO should want to provide a service for which it is not directly
reimbursed, as long as larger costs are thereby avoided.
While Expression (4.4) applies to the ACO as a whole, aligning
the incentives of those actually making decisions about resource use,
often individual doctors, is another matter. If clinicians continue to be
paid mainly by fee-for-service, even if part of the fees are initially withheld, it will be no easy matter to get them to care about indirect savings
they may create for the organization. It probably cannot be done well
just by designing formulas for allocating shared savings among pro-
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viders who are only minimally integrated. Successful ACOs will truly
integrate providers across medical specialties with a shared purpose to
coordinate care more effectively, and they will invest in shared information technology and in systems of data analysis to help them better
understand their own performance.
ACOs: Regulation or Competition?
Having explained the basic ACO idea, I now discuss where it might
take us if it catches on in a big way. Is the ACO model compatible
with a greater reliance on market forces, with provider performance
disciplined by the exercise of consumer choice, or is it better viewed
as a form of incentive-based regulation? Given the growing interest in
ACOs, along with ongoing discussion of the proper role of markets in
health care, this is an important question in the debate over health care
reform.
Because of the way ACOs are being implemented in Medicare,
enrollees do not actively choose them. Enrollees can get linked to ACOs
based on where they get their primary care, and in that way they can
exercise a choice. It is certainly possible that an enrollee would choose
a doctor because she belongs to an ACO with a reputation for high quality. But that choice has no implications for the enrollee’s premium or
for the services covered, nor is the enrollee limited to receiving services
only from providers who are part of that ACO. Thus, the ACO’s motivation for concern about costs (as opposed to quality) comes entirely from
the incentives created by the payment mechanisms implemented by the
regulator (Medicare). The possibility of using cost reductions to lower
premiums and thereby attract more enrollees does not come into play.
ACO models are also attracting interest in private insurance markets (Higgins et al. 2011). One might suppose that if the model is being
used in the private sector it must be part of a market approach. But
consider the most prominent private example, the Alternative Quality
Contract (AQC), created by Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Massachusetts (Song et al. 2012). Groups of providers that participate in the
AQC are similar in many ways to Medicare ACOs: they agree to accept
responsibility for the comprehensive care of a group of enrollees, they
can share in savings if they can keep total fee-for-service billings below
a predetermined target, and they are rewarded for meeting quality goals.
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The populations they are responsible for come from enrollees in the
Massachusetts BCBS HMO. Each HMO enrollee must choose a primary care provider. If the provider is part of a group that is participating in the AQC, the enrollee is linked to that group. As in Medicare,
an enrollee might well choose a doctor because he is part of a group
with a reputation for high-quality care. But again, this choice has no
implications for the premium the enrollee pays or the services covered.
Thus, as in Medicare ACOs, incentives to control costs for groups participating in the AQC come from the payment model set up by BCBS.
A group that does a superior job of controlling costs and could therefore
afford to set lower premiums is precluded from using lower premiums
to attract more enrollees.
So it seems that the ACO model, at least as it is currently being
implemented by Medicare and in the AQC, is more a tool for changing provider incentives within a regulated system than a vehicle for
empowering consumer choice. Can it be adapted in a way that would
increase the role of consumers? I submit that it can, and that doing so
would involve combining ACOs with an earlier idea called managed
competition, most closely associated with economist Alain Enthoven
(1993).
A Digression on Managed Competition
The aim of managed competition is to focus consumer choice
around health plans rather than asking them to shop for individual services. Choice should then be organized in such a way that health plans
set their own premiums, while individuals choosing among plans face
the full difference in premiums between a higher- and lower-priced
plan. Enthoven (1993) argued that in a properly designed competitive system, the health plans that would win out would be largely selfcontained groups of providers: “Managed competition occurs at the
level of integrated financing and delivery plans, not at the individual
provider level. Its goal is to divide providers in each community into
competing economic units and to use market forces to motivate them to
develop efficient delivery systems” (p. 29). These “integrated delivery
systems” would, in other words, look a lot like what we now call ACOs.6
There are several other important aspects of how competition is
“managed” in this model. A health plan is required to accept all appli-
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cants during open enrollment periods. It must charge the same premium to all applicants for the same coverage (or only limited variation, perhaps by enrollee age, is allowed). The set of covered services
and copayments are limited to a small number of different packages, to
make consumer comparisons easier.
But because of prior differences in health status, some enrollees will
cost much more to cover than others, regardless of what the health plan
does. A key adjunct to these rules, therefore, is that payments to health
plans be “risk adjusted,” which means that plans that attract a sicker
mix of enrollees are paid more, and plans that enroll a healthier mix are
paid less. Without such risk adjustments, plans have strong incentives
to do whatever they can to attract relatively healthy enrollees and avoid
sicker ones, a frequent criticism of the way competition among health
plans has traditionally operated. Risk adjustment is intended to help
focus plan efforts on delivering the best product rather than on attracting the most profitable population. Risk adjustment is also a matter of
fairness to plans and of making the managed competition approach
acceptable to them. If plans are attempting to deliver high quality at a
reasonable cost, they should not be penalized if they happen to attract a
relatively unhealthy population.
The ideas of managed competition have been influential in U.S.
health policy, and the ACA takes additional steps toward implementing
them. Medicare already incorporates many of managed competition’s
features in two of its programs: Medicare Advantage (Medicare Part C)
and the prescription drug benefit (Part D). Medicare Advantage (MA) is
Medicare’s program of capitation contracting with managed care plans,
which has been around in different forms and under different names
since the 1980s; the prescription drug benefit has only been available
since 2006. Both programs have two key features: 1) Medicare makes
risk-adjusted payments to participating health plans, and 2) plans make
competitive bids that affect the premiums enrollees face; thus, plans can
use their bids as a mechanism to attract enrollees.
The premium-setting processes and risk adjustment mechanisms
are complicated in both programs (Duggan, Healy, and Morton 2008;
Song, Cutler, and Chernew 2012). I will merely sketch the process used
in MA. Each plan bids a premium it will accept for a person of average risk. These bids are compared with a county-specific benchmark
rate determined by Medicare. If a bid is above the benchmark, then
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the difference is added to the enrollee’s premium. As a result, the total
premium received by the plan is equal to its bid. If the bid is below
the benchmark, then the plan receives its bid plus 75 percent of the
difference. However, the extra payment above the bid is to go back to
enrollees in reduced premiums or added benefits. Medicare also adjusts
the premium it pays to each plan based on the risk profile of the plan’s
enrollees, increasing the premium for a plan that attracts above-average
risks and decreasing it for one with below-average risks. These risk
adjustments are based on the enrollees’ demographic characteristics and
on diagnoses reported on their Medicare claims in the past year.
I would not suggest that the experience with either of these programs offers an unqualified endorsement for the merits of the managed
competition model. If MA were really working well, it would be saving
Medicare money relative to the traditional system, but that has not been
the case. On the contrary, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
has found that in recent years Medicare paid MA plans amounts that
were significantly higher than it would have paid for the same enrollees
in traditional Medicare. That made MA plans a target for rate reductions to help finance the coverage expansions contained in the ACA. As
for Medicare Part D, it has in some ways performed better than critics
expected (Duggan, Healy, and Morton 2008), but researchers analyzing actual plan choices have raised serious questions about the ability
of many enrollees to choose plans in their own best interest (Abaluck
and Gruber 2011; Heiss et al. 2013). These two programs demonstrate,
nonetheless, that it is possible to use competitive bidding processes in
Medicare—in other words, to allow participating health plans to set
their own premiums—and it is fair to say that risk-adjustment mechanisms are getting more sophisticated over time.7
The ACA took a step toward broader application of the managed
competition model by mandating the creation of “health insurance
exchanges,” institutions whereby individuals without employersponsored coverage or small businesses can shop for coverage, beginning in 2014.8 These insurance exchanges have important managed
competition features. For example, subsidies to individuals do not
depend on the plan chosen, so that individuals bear the additional costs
of choosing a more expensive plan. The exchanges also use risk adjustment to blunt incentives of plans to seek out the healthy and avoid the
sick. A further example of a proposal to expand the application of man-
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aged competition is U.S. Representative and current House Speaker
Paul Ryan’s plan to convert Medicare to a program of “premium support,” giving enrollees a fixed dollar amount that they could supplement as they wish and letting them shop for coverage. Ryan’s original
2011 proposal would in effect have ultimately moved all enrollees into
MA, but more recent versions of the plan retain traditional Medicare
as an option that enrollees could choose (Feldman, Coulam, and Dowd
2012).9
Fitting ACOs into Managed Competition
Returning now to payment reform and in particular to ACOs, I would
argue that the Medicare ACO model is not so different from the managed competition approach used in MA. If these two models are to converge, one important step is that enrollees must actively choose ACOs
rather than merely be linked to them. One can understand the political
motivation for making the introduction of ACOs as innocuous as possible for the Medicare population, but if we want consumer choice to
help drive provider performance on both cost and quality, being served
by an ACO must be a choice and it must have some consequences.10
The enrollee should bear some cost in more limited access to providers,
but the possibility of benefit through reduced premiums should also
open up.11
The spending target for an ACO is initially being set by trending
forward actual Medicare spending on the ACO’s enrollees in the prior
three-year period. Setting targets in this way is a form of risk adjustment—an ACO with enrollees who have used a lot of care in the past
will have a higher target than one with enrollees who have used less
care—and not so dissimilar to what is done in MA.12 One could imagine
altering the process of target setting to make it even more similar. An
ACO could bid its own target for covering an enrollee of average risk,
which would determine the premium that enrollees would pay, and then
that bid amount could be risk-adjusted to determine the spending target
that applied to that ACO.
The shared savings aspect of the ACO model does make it a little
different from prospective payment as it operates in MA. We can highlight the difference by recalling our earlier equation for the revenue that
an ACO receives:

Payment Reform and “Bending the Curve” 69

(4.1)

R = TOTFFS + α × (TAR − TOTFFS).

A key issue is the value of α. With purely prospective payment,
α = 1, and once the target is set it is irrelevant what fee-for-service payments would have been. In the ACO model α can be a smaller number,
such as 0.5, in which case revenues depend also on what they would
have been under fee-for-service. Allowing revenues to depend also
on TOTFFS provides another form of risk adjustment, this one retrospective, in addition to that built into the determination of the target.
Because enrollees’ needs for services can be predicted only imperfectly
based on information available prospectively, it will turn out that some
ACOs will have enrollee populations that are sicker and more costly
than expected, for reasons beyond the ACOs’ control.
The drawback to setting α < 1 is that it weakens the incentive to
control costs and perpetuates to some degree the perverse incentives
present in fee-for-service payment, because providing more services
still adds to revenue. But there are important benefits to having shared
savings and risks. They reduce the immediate financial benefit from
withholding care that is present with purely prospective payment,
which should be reassuring to enrollees. As noted, shared savings also
reduce the risk faced by ACOs, which increases their willingness to
participate, especially for smaller entities with more limited ability to
themselves spread risk over large enrollee populations. Thus, the use of
shared savings rather than purely prospective rates can be compatible
with a market-based approach.13
The dependence of payments to ACOs on quality targets is also
a departure from traditional capitation methodology, but Medicare is
also introducing quality-based bonuses for MA plans, so this is not a
fundamental difference. What about extending the ACO model outside
Medicare to the nongovernment insurance market? Can it be done in a
way that also relies on consumer choice to motivate provider groups to
compete on both cost and quality? I am hopeful that it can, with health
insurance exchanges used to manage the process.
I earlier noted a difficulty with the AQC model in Massachusetts.
Enrollees attributed to a participating provider group are drawn from
those in the BCBS HMO. But as in the Medicare ACO model, the
enrollees do not actively choose a group, and their premiums and the set
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of covered services and available providers do not depend on the group
to which they are linked. While enrollees may be drawn to a group on
the basis of its reputation for quality, they get no direct benefit from
choosing one that successfully controls costs. This situation could be
remedied by having each provider group participating in the AQC act
like a mini-HMO. Each group could have its own premium and its own
set of in-network providers, and enrollees could choose among them. A
shared savings approach, rather than relying only on prospectively set
premiums, would reduce the risk borne by provider groups and make
them more willing to participate in this sort of arrangement, as well as
easing the fears of consumers about incentives to hold back care.
The obvious next question, though, is why would we need BCBS to
mediate between consumers and provider groups? Why shouldn’t consumers just choose the ACO directly? An entity is still needed to manage and administer the process, but for the most part a health insurance
exchange is better suited to this task than a health insurer like BCBS.
One important reason is that risk adjustment, which shifts premium
revenues from insurance plans (or ACOs) that enroll relatively healthy
populations to those that enroll more of the sick, should ideally be carried out over a pool that is as broad and representative as possible. The
ACA did not extend health insurance exchanges beyond individual and
small-firm coverage to the much larger pool of those insured through
employment in large firms, but in the future we could move in that
direction.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
I began the chapter with a generally accepted claim that, at least
in principle, the United States needs to bend the curve of health care
spending rather substantially and rather soon. The greatest urgency
comes from the burden of health care on government budgets, but any
solution is likely to involve our entire health care system. Consumers
and providers both must therefore be open to significant changes in the
way our system works. Changing provider incentives by moving away
from fee-for-service payment is one important step. Fee-for-service
not only encourages the provision of any services that are profitable
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for providers without regard to their effectiveness, it contributes to the
fragmented nature of our system and does not promote a focus on maintaining and improving health in the most cost-effective way.
The ACO idea—paying organizations of providers at largely prospective rates to be accountable for the care of defined populations—
has a great deal of appeal. I have argued further that this approach can
be consistent with using competitive bidding to set payment rates and
relying on consumer choice to motivate ACOs to compete on both quality and cost. In essence, this is adapting the ACO model to the familiar
idea of managed competition. We would need to move away from having individuals passively linked to ACOs and instead make membership
an active choice, with consequences for premiums and provider networks. At the same time, in order to make managed competition more
acceptable to somewhat smaller provider groups and to consumers, risk
adjustments would be carried out not only prospectively but also retrospectively, as is already done in the Medicare prescription drug benefit.
In other words, a shared savings model would be used rather than pure
prospective payment. Making payments to ACOs (or other forms of
health plans that consumers could alternatively choose) contingent on
quality measures can also be a part of this model.
There are many important questions about whether the model I
have outlined is a viable approach to significantly bending the curve
of rising spending while promoting improvements in quality. In Medicare Advantage, for example, the managed competition model does not
have a great track record of success (but the situation may be improving). Can incentives be made strong enough to motivate real change in
the way medical practice is organized, real integration, without placing provider groups at too much risk (Frakt and Mayes 2012)? Is it
reasonable to think that informed consumer choice can motivate good
behavior by providers of something as complex as health coverage?
Can we develop methods of risk adjustment that are fair to health plans
and that eliminate the incentive to seek out certain types of enrollees
while trying to avoid others? Will competition prove “workable” in the
sense that combinations of providers will be unable to exercise excessive market power relative to consumers (Berenson et al. 2012; Quealy
and Katz 2015)? The idea is promising enough that we should continue
to move aggressively to get better answers to these questions.
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In concluding the chapter, I want to briefly discuss one other issue
that is relevant to how far we can potentially get in controlling health
spending through a market-based strategy. I will first talk about it in a
simplified, very abstract way, and then relate things in a more practical way to Medicare Part D. Let the curve in Figure 4.3 represent the
relationship between health spending and health if resources were being
used in the most effective way—a kind of “production function” relating inputs to output in an efficient manner. Points B and C, for example, are both on the production function; moving from B to C involves
increasing spending—giving up more of other things—to get improved
health.
Many analysts say that we do not have to think about trade-offs
between health and other things because the poor incentives built into
our system actually leave us at a point like A, beneath the production function. If so, improving incentives might reduce spending and
improve health simultaneously, moving us, for example, from A to B.
But if we can get to point B, the question of where we want to be along
the curve must ultimately involve trade-offs.14
In other market situations, when purchasing cars, televisions, or cell
phones, for example, people face trade-offs between cost and quality all
the time. Generally, we are happy to let them make their own decisions.
Ability to pay matters, people with higher incomes drive nicer cars, but
we are typically fine with that as an intrinsic part of a free enterprise
system. Applying the same logic to health care, we might think of the
curve in Figure 4.3 at the level of one individual, and of the points along
the curve as different insurance packages that have both different premiums and levels of coverage, including different sets of services that
are covered. We hope that market forces will eliminate packages that
lie below the curve. Then individuals can choose where along the curve
they want to be, say, at point B or C. Naturally, the wealthier will find it
easier to pay for C and will be more likely to choose it.
But are we as a society willing to live with that? Will a Medicare
program that explicitly lets the rich buy access to services that the poor
cannot afford be acceptable, or will it be seen as inappropriate rationing? As things stand, the Medicare program does not explicitly consider
costs when it makes decisions about whether new services will be covered. Similarly, the ACA established the Patient-Centered Outcomes
Research Institute to study the comparative effectiveness of different
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Figure 4.3 Eliminating Waste versus Facing Trade-offs
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medical interventions, but it prohibited Medicare from using analyses
of cost per quality-adjusted life year to make coverage decisions.
The example of Medicare Part D is instructive. Part D drug plans
are not required to cover every drug. In many therapeutic classes, a plan
can give preferred status (assign lower copayments) to certain drugs
relative to others that are close therapeutic substitutes. This gives a plan
leverage to negotiate with drug manufacturers for lower prices, the savings from which (one hopes) would as a result of competition largely
be passed along to enrollees in lower premiums. However, the ability
of plans to differentiate themselves through the set of drugs they cover
is limited. They are required to cover at least two drugs in every therapeutic class, and “all or substantially all” drugs in six protected classes
(immunosuppressants, antidepressants, antipsychotics, anticonvulsants,
HIV antiretrovirals, and cancer). As Duggan, Healy, and Morton (2008)
discuss, these restrictions limit the ability of plans to negotiate with
manufacturers over prices. They also limit a plan’s ability to keep premiums low by choosing not to cover certain high-cost drugs of limited
or questionable benefit.
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A similar issue arises with respect to insurance plans offered in
health insurance exchanges. When individuals are mandated to have
insurance coverage, some minimum standard of what constitutes creditable coverage must be set. The more inclusive that standard, the less
scope there is for individuals to make trade-offs to get lower premiums.
Similarly, the set of services that an ACO is accountable for providing must be defined. The main point is that eliminating truly wasteful
spending from the system (getting from point A to the curve in Figure
4.3), as difficult as that is to achieve, will not be enough to limit spending growth to an acceptable level in the long run. As a society we must
be willing to face the possibility that small benefits in health care may
sometimes come at too high a cost.

Notes
1. By “excess cost growth,” the CBO means the amount by which the growth of
health spending per capita, adjusted for changes in the age composition of the
population, exceeds the growth of the economy’s capacity to produce on a per
capita basis.
2. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) advises Congress about
Medicare and generally does excellent work. Chapter 2 of its June 2011 report
(MedPAC 2011) is entitled “Improving Payment Accuracy and Appropriate Use of
Ancillary Services.” It is interesting that the chapter refers to “payment accuracy”
more than 25 times but never defines what “accuracy” means.
3. Porter and Teisberg (2007) would disagree. See Note 6.
4. Although many researchers have contributed to the development of this idea, the
person most associated with it is Elliot Fisher, a physician and researcher at Dartmouth. Fisher says that the term emerged originally in discussion between him
and Glenn Hackbarth, former chair of MedPAC. Health policy discussions abound
with three-letter abbreviations. In this chapter, the most prominent and easily confused are ACO, for Accountable Care Organization, and ACA, for Affordable
Care Act, the short title of the health care reform passed in 2010. Adding to the
confusion, I will later discuss the AQC, or Alternative Quality Contract, a way
of contracting with ACO-like entities developed by Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Massachusetts.
5. Although I will frame the discussion around Equation (1), Medicare has in fact
introduced several variations of the ACO model, including Pioneer (for organizations that are more prepared to take on risk based on prior experience with
doing so) and two tracks in the Shared Savings Program (Berenson and Burton
2011). All of them involve a range in the neighborhood of the target where α = 0,
meaning that the organization is effectively paid fee-for-service. In track 1 of the

Payment Reform and “Bending the Curve” 75

6.

7.

8.
9.

10.
11.

Shared Savings Program, α = 0 in the first three years whenever TOTFFS exceeds
the target—the organization initially bears no downside risk. In 2015 Medicare
announced that organizations in track 1 would be allowed to stay there for an additional three years. It also established a track 3 for organizations willing to accept
greater risk.
Porter and Teisberg (2007) offer a different vision of competition. They argue
that medical providers are best organized into “integrated practice units” focused
around particular “medical conditions and cycles of care.” These entities would
be well positioned to accept bundled payments for episodes or “cycles” of care.
Arguably, rather than relying on single entities responsible for all types of care,
organizing groups around particular conditions could lead to gains from greater
specialization and more opportunity for choice. But how these ideas could be integrated into a model of insurance and cost-conscious consumer choice does not
seem to be well worked out. One could imagine an insurance plan that in return
for a premium covers primary care and also provides in effect a set of vouchers
for treatment of particular conditions as they arise. If you have diabetes, are diagnosed with breast cancer, or experience severe low back pain, you have a voucher
that covers standard quality care for that condition over a defined episode or for
some defined period of time. If you want to use a group that charges more than the
voucher covers, you pay the difference. I am not aware of any real-world examples of such a model of health insurance. For further discussion see Enthoven,
Crosson, and Shortell (2007).
Brown et al. (2014), however, find that MA insurers may be a step ahead of the
program administrators. They find that even after Medicare made changes in 2004
to better capture differences in risk across enrollees, MA plans were still attracting relatively healthy enrollees conditional on measured risk. On the other hand,
working with a larger data set, Newhouse et al. (2014) do not replicate those findings, and on the whole they are more optimistic about the future of managed competition in MA.
Participation in the exchange for small businesses has been much slower to
develop than exchange participation by individuals (Galewitz 2015).
The original Ryan plan for Medicare was strongly criticized by Democrats. For
example, in his acceptance speech for the 2012 presidential nomination, President Obama, referring to the Ryan plan, said, “I will never turn Medicare into a
voucher.” However, much (though certainly not all) of the criticism of the plan had
to do with the way that the premium support (or voucher) amount would be set and
updated over time, with critics arguing the plan would shift very substantial costs
to enrollees. In principle, the level of premium support is a separable issue from
the concept itself.
One analyst stated, accurately, that “proponents of the shared savings model have
designed an approach that attempts to upset or dislocate no one” (Berenson 2010).
Improving consumer incentives is not the only reason for asking that enrollees in
an ACO be limited to the set of providers affiliated with it. An ACO faces additional risk that it will have little ability to control if it is accountable for Medicare
services that an enrollee receives from providers outside the ACO.
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12. Risk adjustment in MA is based on enrollee demographic characteristics and past
diagnoses rather than directly on past spending, but the weights applied to the
variables that go into the risk adjustment are based on how those variables predict spending in traditional Medicare. Setting a target based on the past spending
experience of a group’s own enrollees could have the perverse effect of penalizing
groups that were already managing care efficiently by giving them lower targets.
13. After-the-fact risk adjustment (or shared savings and risks, which essentially is
the same thing) is already present in Medicare Part D. If a prescription drug plan’s
expenses for drugs are more than 5 percent above or below its target based on
risk-adjusted premiums, Medicare shares in the cost overrun or the savings (Duggan, Healy, and Morton 2008). A similar approach is being used during the first
three years of operation of health insurance exchanges under the ACA, although
funding has been less than insurers anticipated (Blase 2015; Cunningham 2012).
Interestingly, however, in Part D and in the insurance exchanges the insurance
plan accepts full risk in the vicinity of the target (α = 1), whereas with ACOs the
opposite is the case, α = 0 in the vicinity of the target (see also Note 5).
14. Over time the entire curve shifts upward as a result of advances in knowledge
(although other factors, such as worsening diets, may work to shift it down). But
new knowledge also extends the relatively flat part of the curve by expanding our
capacity to spend large amounts of money for small expected benefits.
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5
The Potential Effects
of the Affordable Care Act
on Disability Insurance and
Workers’ Compensation
Marcus Dillender
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) represents one of
the largest overhauls to the United States health care system since the
introduction of Medicare and Medicaid. Among the reform’s many provisions are an employer mandate, an individual mandate, an expansion
of Medicaid, subsidies for low-income people to purchase coverage,
and the establishment of health insurance exchanges. The ACA also
reforms the individual market and implements many measures aimed at
reducing medical costs.
Despite its many changes to the health care system, the ACA largely
ignores related social insurance programs that also provide health care.
Two programs in particular—federal disability and workers’ compensation—deal with people with medical issues and have overlapping
agendas with health insurance. Disability insurance provides health
insurance for people who are unable to work for over a year due to
health concerns, while workers’ compensation insurance pays medical
expenses for people injured at work. Unlike traditional health insurance, both programs also provide cash assistance to beneficiaries.
Although the ACA does not address these programs, it could have
potentially major spillover effects on both federal disability and workers’ compensation. First, the ACA could affect the likelihood that people
apply for these programs since health insurance may substitute for the
types of services they provide. This would affect the number and types
of people receiving benefits as well as overall costs. Second, the ACA
has several features that will change the types of insurance plans people
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have, such as eliminating copays for preventive care and taxing expensive, high-benefit plans. These features could result in healthier people
or more cost shifting. Finally, the ACA implements many changes that
alter medical resources. Since both disability and workers’ compensation tap into the same systems as health insurance, changes that affect
the medical system more generally will affect these programs as well.
This chapter discusses the implications that the ACA has for federal disability insurance and workers’ compensation insurance. I do not
attempt to determine whether the net impact of the costs of these programs will be positive or negative, as there is much uncertainty about
the implementation and impact of the ACA. Instead, I discuss various
aspects of the ACA, federal disability insurance, and workers’ compensation, and I consider the possible interactions between the ACA and
these social insurance programs.

THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Implementation of the ACA began immediately after it was signed
into law in 2010 and will continue until 2020. Table 5.1 summarizes
various aspects of the law.
The employer mandate requires that companies with 50 or more fulltime employees offer affordable coverage to their full-time employees
or pay a penalty. The penalty for not offering health insurance is $2,000
per employee after the first 30 employees. Employers’ plans must pay
for at least 60 percent of covered health care expenses, and employees
must pay no more than 9.5 percent of family income for the coverage.
To prevent employers from offering plans that meet these requirements
but do not meet employees’ needs, the ACA also assesses firms that
offer coverage a separate penalty of $3,000 for each employee who
receives subsidized coverage through the exchanges.
The individual mandate requires nearly everyone to have health
insurance or pay a penalty. The penalty for not having health insurance
eventually rises to the maximum of $695 per uninsured person or 2.5
percent of household income over the filing threshold. To avoid the
penalty, nonexempt individuals must maintain minimum essential coverage, which is defined as employer-sponsored coverage, government-
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sponsored coverage, or coverage purchased through the individual
marketplace. Everyone is subject to the mandate except the following
groups: people with incomes below 100 percent of the federal poverty
level, people not required to file income taxes, people with religious
objections, American Indians, undocumented immigrants, and incarcerated persons.
In addition to requiring that individuals purchase insurance, the
ACA also established health insurance exchanges. These marketplaces
opened in 2013 and allow people to compare plans from the individual
market on a single website. The ACA issued several reforms for the
individual market as well, including requiring insurers to accept all who
apply for coverage, restricting the number of factors that could be used
for pricing, and requiring certain coverage. To make insurance more
affordable for people whose employers do not offer insurance and who
are ineligible for Medicaid, the ACA provides subsidies for those making up to 400 percent of the federal poverty level.
In addition to subsidizing coverage for people not eligible for Medicaid, the ACA originally required that states expand Medicaid so that
all households with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty
level would qualify. The federal government would pay for the full cost
of these newly eligible people in the first three years and no less than
90 percent thereafter. However, in June 2012, the Supreme Court ruled
that the federal government could not require states to expand their
Medicaid coverage; thus, the expansion of Medicaid is optional (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2012). As of July 2014, 26 states and the District of
Columbia have opted to expand Medicaid (Kaiser Family Foundation
2014).
The ACA also implements a variety of measures aimed at reducing
Medicare costs. It has established the Independent Payment Advisory
Board (IPAB), which will make recommendations to cut Medicare costs
if they grow larger than the per capita GDP plus one percentage point.
If Congress fails to pass an alternative proposal with the same cost savings, the IPAB recommendations will become law. The IPAB can also
make nonbinding recommendations about private health spending. In
addition to the IPAB, the ACA also encourages physicians and hospitals to form accountable care organizations (ACOs), which are sets of
providers that bear responsibility for the cost and quality of care delivered to Medicare patients. Any Medicare savings from this coordinated

• Must pay $2,000 per full-time employee (after first 30 employees) for not offering any
insurance options
• Must pay $3,000 for not offering affordable coverage, for all employees receiving a tax credit
for insurance purchased on exchangea,b
Insurance plan must pay for at least 60% of covered health care expenses for a typical population,
and employees must pay no more than 9.5% of family income for employer coverage.a

Contribution
requirement
Individual mandate
Provisions
All people must purchase health insurance or pay a penalty.
Penalty for not buying The penalty is the greater of

• For 2014, $95 per uninsured person or 1% of household income over the filing threshold
• For 2015, $325 per uninsured person or 2% of household income over the filing threshold

Subsidized insurance

• For 2016 and beyond, $695 per uninsured person or 2.5% of household income over the filing
threshold.b
For anyone earning up to 400% of poverty level whose employer does not offer health insurance,
covers less than 60% of the actuarial value, or whose employee share exceeds 9.5% of income.a
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Table 5.1 Summary of Major Changes under the Affordable Care Act
Employer mandate
Employers with 50 or more full-time employees must offer a health insurance plan to all fullProvisions
time employees or pay an annual penalty.a,b
Full-time definition
30 or more hours per weekb
Penalties
Two types of penalties:

Exemptions

Medicaid
To qualify
Individual market
Can charge different
premiums based on
Guaranteed issue
Marketplaces created

Income below 100% of the federal poverty level; not being required to file income taxes; having
religious objections; having a coverage gap shorter than three months; or being an American
Indian, undocumented immigrant, or incarcerated person.a
Expanded so that people with a household income below 133% of the poverty level will qualify.a
Family structure, geography, age, and tobacco use.a
Yesa
State Exchanges, which allow individuals and small businesses to compare and purchase private
insurance that meets coverage standards.a

SOURCE: aKaiser Family Foundation (2013); bKolstad and Kowalski (2012).
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care would be shared with providers. Additionally, the ACA reduces
Medicare payments to hospitals with high rates of potentially preventable readmissions. In doing so, it alters hospitals’ incentives to provide
high-quality and cost-effective care on the first admission. Finally, the
ACA increases the government’s resources to fight fraud, which could
save money, since the Congressional Budget Office estimates that each
additional dollar spent on fraud prevention reduces $1.75 of Medicare
spending (Zuckerman 2010).
As they were intended to do, these reforms have increased health
insurance coverage. By June 2014, around 10.3 million more adults
had health insurance because of the ACA (Sommers et al. 2014). This
number is expected to grow over the next several years. The Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation predict that
the ACA will result in 19 million people having insurance in 2015 who
otherwise would not. They expect this number to increase to 26 million
by 2017 (Congressional Budget Office 2014). The anticipated cost of
the ACA net of any savings is $1,383 billion for 2015–2024. The vast
majority of these costs come from increased spending on Medicaid, as
well as subsidies for people purchasing insurance in the marketplace.
Schoen et al. (2011) estimate that the ACA could lead to a 70 percent
decrease in the underinsurance rate, while Hill (2012) estimates that
the ACA will reduce out-of-pocket spending for people with individual
insurance.

FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE
Basic Program Information
Federal disability insurance pays benefits to people under the full
retirement age who are unable to work because they have a medical
condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death.
Disabled people are potentially eligible for two different programs:
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI). The SSDI program provides benefits to individuals who
have paid into the Social Security system and meet certain minimum
work requirements, and the SSI program is means tested and does not
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have work or contribution requirements, but it restricts benefits to individuals with certain asset and resource limitations (Moulta-Ali 2013).
With SSDI, the benefit amount is related to the disabled worker’s
former earnings in covered employment. The average benefit amount
as of 2012 was $1,130 for disabled workers (Social Security Administration 2013). SSDI recipients can receive health insurance coverage
through Medicare but only after a two-year waiting period that begins
the day they qualify for benefits. After a disabling event, individuals
must wait at least five months before receiving cash benefits.
The SSI program pays a flat cash benefit to aged, blind, and disabled individuals who have very limited income and assets. The benefit
amount for SSI as of 2012 was $698 for eligible individuals and $1,048
for eligible couples (Social Security Administration 2014a). Individuals
on SSI receive health insurance through the Medicaid program. Unlike
SSDI recipients, SSI recipients receive cash benefits and health insurance immediately upon qualifying for benefits. As of 2012, around 86
percent of the people receiving SSI benefits were disabled (Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities 2014).
Figure 5.1 shows the number of SSDI recipients, including dependents and the money spent on SSDI over time. The number of people on
federal disability has swelled in recent decades. In 1970, approximately
2.7 million people, or about 1.3 percent of the population received
SSDI. By the end of 2012, approximately 10.9 million people, or 3.5
percent of the population, received SSDI. Total SSDI benefits paid in
2012 were $137 billion (Social Security Administration 2013). Autor
and Duggan (2006) find that this rapid increase in the number of people
receiving SSDI can be attributed to congressional reforms to disability
screening that enabled workers with low mortality disorders to more
easily qualify for benefits, a rise in the after-tax SSDI benefit, and an
increase in female labor force participation, which expanded the pool
of eligible workers.
Figure 5.2 shows SSI applicants and new recipients over time.
While the number of people newly receiving SSI because of their age
has decreased slightly over time, the number of new disabled recipients has increased. As of 2012, around 8.3 million people received SSI,
while total SSI benefits paid were $49 billion (Social Security Administration 2013).
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Figure 5.1 SSDI Beneficiaries and Benefits by Year
People receiving SSDI benefits (including dependents)
SSDI benefits

Number of SSDI recipients

10,000,000

160,000
140,000
120,000

8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000

100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000

2,000,000
0

20,000

SSDI benefits in 2013 dollars (in millions)

12,000,000

0

SOURCE: Social Security Administration (2014c).

Social Security and Medicare are both funded from a 15.3 percent
payroll tax on earnings that is split equally between employees and
employers. Of the 15.3 percent, 1.8 percent of the payroll tax goes into
the disability trust fund to pay for SSDI, and 2.9 percent goes toward
Medicare; the rest of the tax goes in the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Fund (Moulta-Ali 2013). SSI is financed through the general revenue of the United States. Medicaid, which SSI recipients receive, is
funded jointly by state and federal government.
The ACA’s Potential Effect on Disability Insurance
The ACA will likely exert two countervailing forces on people’s
decisions to apply for disability insurance. Applicants to both SSDI
and SSI face uncertainty about whether or not they qualify for benefits,
and they may have to wait long periods of time for their disability status to be determined. During this time, applicants cannot work. Since
employer-sponsored insurance has traditionally been better than the
other forms of insurance available, people may have had to go without
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Figure 5.2 SSI Applicants and New Recipients by Year
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high-quality, affordable health insurance to apply for disability coverage. However, the insurance exchanges and subsidized coverage from
the ACA promise affordable health insurance outside employment.
Similarly, the ACA mandates that insurance companies accept all who
apply, which will increase coverage options for those with a disability. Improving coverage options for those with a disability could free
workers from employment lock, thereby reducing the costs of applying for disability coverage. This would cause the number of disability
applications to rise, especially those for SSDI, since those applicants
will have to wait an additional two years after receiving benefits before
they receive Medicare coverage. On the other hand, a lack of good
health insurance alternatives to employer-sponsored health insurance
is one reason people apply for SSDI. By creating good health insurance
opportunities apart from employer-sponsored coverage and Medicare,
the ACA lowers the benefit of applying for disability. This could result
in fewer people applying for disability.
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Two papers empirically examine which effect dominates. Gruber
and Kubik (2002) study how health insurance factors into the likelihood that people apply for SSDI using Health and Retirement Study
data. They find that people who have access to insurance from a source
other than their own employers, such as insurance through a spouse’s
employer or retiree coverage, are 26–74 percent more likely to apply for
SSDI benefits than those without such alternative sources of coverage.
Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2014) study what happened to disability applications after the Massachusetts health insurance reform,
which has a structure that is very similar to the ACA. They find that
disability applications increased in Massachusetts relative to neighboring states in the first year following health insurance reform. After the
first year, there was no statistically significant effect of the reform on
total applications. These results suggest that there may have been pentup demand for disability benefits for people who had been working
with impairments. Despite finding no evidence of long-term changes in
the aggregate, they find important county-level heterogeneity. They find
that SSDI and SSI applications increased in counties with high levels of
health insurance coverage prior to the reform and decreased in counties
with low levels of coverage. Since Massachusetts had higher insurance
coverage than the rest of the country before its health insurance reform,
Maestas, Mullen, and Strand conclude that the ACA may lead to a net
decrease in disability insurance applications.
Just as the need for health insurance has resulted in some people
being tied to employers, it can lead to some people being tied to disability insurance. Coe and Rupp (2013) examine how access to health
insurance for disabled individuals in both the nongroup market and
Medicaid affects the exit from disability. They find that SSI beneficiaries with some Medicaid expenditures are more likely to exit disability
when they have more health insurance options available to them, as are
SSDI recipients who do not have access to supplemental health insurance outside Medicare.
Gruber and Kubik (2002) suggest that the ACA would lead to an
increase in disability applicants. However, results from the Massachusetts reform suggest that the ACA will likely affect certain people
and areas differently than others. The results of Coe and Rupp (2013)
suggest that the ACA may reduce disability lock for some people and
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allow them to return to work, which would reduce the number of people
receiving disability benefits.
The ACA has the potential to affect disability insurance in ways
not directly related to altering claiming incentives, such as through the
ACA provisions that aim to reduce Medicare costs. These provisions,
which were discussed in the second section of the chapter, directly
affect SSDI beneficiaries, since Medicare is their health insurance.
Many speculate that the IPAB may eventually cut Medicare reimbursement rates for doctors (Vaida 2012). While this would reduce costs
to the Medicare program, it may also make it more difficult for SSDI
recipients to receive medical care, since doctors may be less likely to
accept Medicare patients. Cutting costs and improving care are goals of
ACOs and reasons for not reimbursing preventable readmissions. Both
these measures have the potential to decrease costs while improving the
care that SSDI recipients receive.
In addition to decreasing the costs of applying for SSDI, improving
health insurance options during the two-year waiting period may also
increase the health care access of SSDI recipients. The two-year waiting period is often a concern, since SSDI recipients have health issues.
Riley (2006) studies health insurance and health care access during the
waiting period and finds that 26 percent of SSDI beneficiaries lacked
health insurance during this period. He also finds that SSDI beneficiaries without health insurance had more problems accessing health care
than those with health insurance. Weathers and Stegman (2012) and
Michalopoulos et al. (2012) study a Social Security program that provides health insurance coverage to SSDI beneficiaries while they await
Medicare eligibility. Weathers and Stegman find that these accelerated
benefits increased mental health and physical health one year after
enrollment. Although they find no evidence of changes in mortality,
they point out that this increased health could lower costs once people
are on SSDI. Michalopoulos et al. find that the accelerated benefits program resulted in people having fewer unmet medical needs and reduced
out-of-pocket spending on medical care. They also find that accelerated
benefits enrollees were more likely to search for work. These results
indicate that the ACA may cause SSDI recipients to be healthier and
more likely to exit disability.
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By providing greater access to health care, the ACA may make it
easier for people to obtain the documentation necessary to prove they
have a disability. As part of the application for disability, applicants
need to provide medical records about their disabilities, as well as contact information for all the relevant health care professionals, laboratory
and test results, and the names of medicines they take (Social Security
Administration 2014b). Making the documentation of a disability easier
could result in more people applying for coverage or an increase in the
acceptance rate among those who apply for benefits.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Basic Program Information
Workers’ compensation pays all medical bills for individuals with
work-related injuries and diseases. Unlike federal disability, workers’
compensation is a state-level program. Therefore, all workers’ compensation programs are a little different from each other. In some states,
private insurance companies administer workers’ compensation, while
in others, the states are the sole providers of insurance. For workers
who miss more than three to seven days of work, workers’ compensation also replaces lost wages through indemnity benefits. The injured
workers’ weekly benefits are a function of their weekly earnings and are
subject to state-level maximums. In all states except Texas and Oklahoma, workers’ compensation insurance is mandatory for employers.
Injured workers receiving indemnity benefits usually first receive
temporary total disability (TTD). They receive these benefits until they
are able to return to work or are evaluated for permanent disability benefits. They will be evaluated for permanent disability benefits after they
have reached the state limit for temporary benefits or the physician has
determined they have reached “maximum medical improvement.” Permanent disability benefits comprise two separate types of benefits: permanent total disability (PTD) and permanent partial disability (PPD).
PTD and PPD benefits in that injured workers receive benefits based
on their average weekly wages subject to the state maximum. Workers
stop receiving benefits when they have healed, returned to work, or
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reached the state maximum number of weeks for PTD eligibility. With
PPD benefits, workers are generally given a partial impairment rating
or assigned a fixed schedule of benefits. People are typically allowed to
work while receiving PPD benefits. (See McInerney and Simon [2012]
for a more thorough discussion of different benefit types and Hunt
[2004] for a discussion of the adequacy of those benefits.)
In 2011, nearly 126 million workers were covered by workers’ compensation insurance (Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno 2013). Employers
paid over $77 billion for coverage, and workers received over $60 billion from the system. The majority of workers’ compensation cases—
around 76 percent—are medical-only cases and do not involve payments
for missed work. Figure 5.3 shows workers’ compensation spending on
medical and wage replacement over time. Spending for wage replacement has been falling since the early 1990s, while medical spending has
continued to rise. The share of medical benefits as a percentage of the
total benefits paid for workers’ compensation has risen from around 30
percent in the early 1980s to approximately 50 percent in 2011.
Figure 5.3 Workers’ Compensation Medical and Indemnity Benefits
by Year
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The ACA’s Potential Effect on Workers’ Compensation
The ACA will change the incentive to claim workers’ compensation
by expanding health insurance coverage, which reduces the benefit of
filing for workers’ compensation, regardless of whether the injury is
work related. People without health insurance have an increased incentive to claim that their medical issues are work related even if they
are not so that workers’ compensation will pay the bills. Thus, having
health insurance may lower the incidence of people misclassifying nonwork-related injuries. If an injury occurs at work, health insurance may
still deter workers from filing a claim for workers’ compensation if it is
costly, and there are several reasons to believe that it is. First, employers may dissuade their employees from filing workers’ compensation
because they fear it will increase their premiums. Second, injured workers might not want to deal with the associated paperwork, or they may
fear that they will be called on to prove that their injury was caused
by work, which is not always easy to do. Filing with health insurance,
meanwhile, requires no burden of proof. Third, there may be a stigma
associated with filing a workers’ compensation claim.
According to some studies, a large percentage of workers do not
file a workers’ compensation claim because they have health insurance. Biddle and Roberts (2003) surveyed Michigan workers identified
by physicians as likely having work-related injuries. Of these injured
workers, only 30 percent filed for workers’ compensation. Of the 70
percent who did not file for workers’ compensation, 36 percent said that
having health insurance was the reason. However, Lakdawalla, Reville,
and Seabury (2007) show that people with health insurance are generally more likely to receive workers’ compensation. They hypothesize
that large firms may be more likely to provide workers with information
about workers’ compensation and to encourage them to use it.
Heaton (2012) studies the impact of Massachusetts’s health insurance reform on workers’ compensation by projecting how many emergency room bills would have been paid for by the state’s workers’
compensation system in the absence of the 2006 reform based on 2005
Massachusetts data. Heaton finds that the health care reform resulted in
workers’ compensation paying for 5–10 percent fewer emergency room
medical bills. He finds similarly sized decreases for both the overall
patient population and those with relatively serious medical conditions.

The Potential Effects of the Affordable Care Act 95

In Dillender (2015a), using administrative medical claims data
from Texas, I study the effect of health insurance on young adults filing
workers’ compensation claims. I compare individuals just before and
after they turn 26, the age at which young adults lose access to dependent
coverage under the ACA. This approach yields estimates of the causal
effect of health insurance on workers’ compensation filing. I find that
immediately after people turn 26, initial claims filed for injuries with
easy-to-delay reporting increase, while the overall amount of medical
treatment that workers’ compensation pays for increases by 8 percent.
Despite these increases, overall workers’ compensation medical costs
do not increase dramatically for 26-year-olds because the majority of
this increased care is for less expensive services. These results suggest
that health insurance affects workers’ compensation filing, particularly
at the intensive margin, but not necessarily for the types of services that
drive medical costs.
Overall, the empirical studies suggest that workers’ compensation
will pay for less medical care once more people have health insurance.
In Dillender (2015a), I find evidence that the claiming behavior of people with minor medical needs is influenced by having health insurance.
This would suggest that the overall savings to workers’ compensation
would be modest. Heaton (2012), however, finds evidence that people
with greater medical needs respond to health reform, which suggests
that the cost savings to workers’ compensation could be large. Thus,
while the evidence strongly suggests that the ACA will decrease the
likelihood that health care is paid for by workers’ compensation, the
size of the cost savings to workers’ compensation is difficult to assess.
Also, if people with more severe medical issues respond to workers’
compensation, indemnity claims may also respond by falling slightly
as a result of the ACA; however, no research has explored if and how
indemnity claims are affected by health insurance.
By influencing some people to file claims with health insurance
instead of workers’ compensation, the ACA may result in cost savings
to the workers’ compensation system. However, the ACA may also
change the type of insurance plans people have by encouraging the use
of more high-deductible plans—for example, with a 40 percent excise
tax on health plans with individual premiums above $10,200 and family premiums above $27,500 starting in 2018 (Zuckerman 2010). Since
people will lack first-dollar coverage, they may be more likely to shift
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claims onto workers’ compensation, which will still provide first-dollar
coverage.
The changes to Medicare discussed previously also have implications for workers’ compensation, especially if the IPAB curtails Medicare costs by cutting reimbursement rates. Many states tie workers’
compensation reimbursement rates to Medicare reimbursement rates.
By cutting Medicare reimbursement rates, the ACA would also lower
workers’ compensation reimbursement rates in many states unless state
governments react by changing their laws. Thus, the ACA will lower the
amount of money spent on medical care. However, this may cause providers in these states to be less likely to accept workers’ compensation
patients since they will receive less money for treating them. Even in
states that do not tie their reimbursement rates to Medicare, changes in
Medicare rates may affect workers’ compensation. Auerbach, Heaton,
and Brantley (2014) argue that when Medicare pays physicians less,
it may cause physicians to increase prices for other payers or provide
more services to other patients that provide higher margins. If Medicare
no longer pays providers for certain readmissions, it may have the same
effect if it decreases physicians’ profits from Medicare patients.
Auerbach, Heaton, and Brantley (2014) also argue that the ACA
could change the composition of the labor force. A large literature in
economics finds that the need for health insurance has induced people
to participate in the labor force (Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 2013; Blau
and Gilleskie 2001; Buchmueller and Carpenter 2012; Dillender 2015b;
Nyce et al. 2013; Strumpf 2010). Prior to the ACA, there were few
good health insurance options for the near elderly outside employment.
Auerbach, Heaton, and Brantley argue that the exchanges and subsidies
will allow older people to retire sooner, which may reduce costs, since
older workers typically take longer to recover from injuries and require
more treatment.

POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE ACA ON BOTH PROGRAMS
As both disability insurance and workers’ compensation insurance
tap into the same medical resources that health insurance does, they
will both be affected by the aspects of the ACA that affect the medical
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system more generally. One potential impact of the ACA is to improve
the health of the general population. Research typically finds that health
insurance improves health (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2009; Doyle
2005; Finkelstein et al. 2012), and Courtemanche and Zapata (2014)
find that people reported being in better health as a result of the Massachusetts reform. The ACA also has a focus on prevention by eliminating
copayments for preventive services and including an annual wellness
visit as a part of Medicare. This has the potential to lower the likelihood
that people become disabled or suffer an injury while at work.
The ACA has various strategies to make medical treatment less
expensive, such as with the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, which focuses on identifying effective treatments. The ACA also
implements rules that establish electronic health records, which could
also reduce costs while improving care. By identifying effective treatments and digitizing medical records, the ACA has the potential to
lower costs for medical care paid under both disability insurance and
workers’ compensation.
A potential issue with the dramatic increase in insurance coverage
promised by the ACA is that it will put more stress on existing medical resources. Hofer, Abraham, and Moscovice (2011) point out that
there was already a shortage of primary care doctors before the ACA
and suggest that the increased demand from the ACA could increase
the shortages. Huang and Finegold (2013) find that certain areas will
be hit hard by an increase in demand, while other areas will be able
to meet the demand. They estimate that 7 million people live in areas
where demand for primary care may exceed supply by 10 percent after
the ACA. Physician shortages may increase wait times for injured and
disabled people before they can receive medical care.

CONCLUSION
By overhauling the health insurance system and making many
broad changes to medical care, the ACA promises to change the health
care landscape. In this chapter, I describe the changes taking place
because of the ACA, as well as their implications for two major social
insurance programs with large medical components. I review the con-
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siderable evidence that suggests that expanding health insurance could
affect claiming behavior for both disability and workers’ compensation.
For disability insurance, some evidence suggests that expanding health
insurance may have countervailing effects on overall disability coverage. For workers’ compensation, the evidence points to health insurance covering some of the costs that workers’ compensation insurance
was previously paying.
Apart from affecting claiming behavior, the ACA will likely affect
these social insurance programs in other ways as well. The ACA’s many
cost-saving measures will likely have spillover effects for both disability insurance and workers’ compensation, especially those measures
that aim to identify the most effective treatments. The aspects of the
ACA that aim to improve population health may also result in fewer
work-related injuries and less disability, thereby saving money for both
programs. One negative aspect of the ACA for both of these programs
may be that the increase in insurance coverage puts more strain on medical resources, which could make seeing a doctor more difficult.
References
Antwi, Yaa Akosa, Asako S. Moriya, and Kosali Simon. 2013. “Effects of
Federal Policy to Insure Young Adults: Evidence from the 2010 Affordable
Care Act’s Dependent-Coverage Mandate.” American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy 5(4): 1–28.
Auerbach, David I., Paul Heaton, and Ian Brantley. 2014. How Will the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act Affect Liability Insurance Costs? Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Autor, David H., and Mark G. Duggan. 2006. “The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(3): 71–96.
Biddle, Jeff, and Karen Roberts. 2003. “Claiming Behavior in Workers’ Compensation.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 70(4): 759–780.
Blau, David M., and Donna B. Gilleskie. 2001. “Retiree Health Insurance and
the Labor Force Behavior of Older Men in the 1990s.” Review of Economics and Statistics 83(1): 64–80.
Buchmueller, Thomas, and Christopher Carpenter. 2012. “The Effect of
Requiring Private Employers to Extend Health Benefit Eligibility to SameSex Partners of Employees: Evidence from California.” Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management 31(2): 388–403.

The Potential Effects of the Affordable Care Act 99
Card, David, Carlos Dobkin, and Nicole Maestas. 2009. “Does Medicare Save
Lives?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(2): 597–636.
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 2014. “Policy Basics: Introduction to
Supplemental Security Income.” Washington, DC: Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities. http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/Policy
Basics_SocSec-IntroToSSI.pdf (accessed September 4, 2015).
Coe, Norma, and Kalman Rupp. 2013. “Does Access to Health Insurance
Influence Work Effort among Disability Cash Benefit Recipients?” Center
for Retirement Research Working Paper 2013-10. Boston: Boston College,
Center for Retirement Research.
Congressional Budget Office. 2014. “Updated Estimates of the Effects of the
Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, April 2014.”
Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office. http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45231-ACA_Estimates.pdf
(accessed
September 4, 2015).
Courtemanche, Charles J., and Daniela Zapata. 2014. “Does Universal Coverage Improve Health? The Massachusetts Experience.” Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management 33(1): 36–69.
Doyle, Joseph J. Jr. 2005. “Health Insurance, Treatment and Outcomes: Using
Auto Accidents as Health Shocks.” Review of Economics and Statistics 87(2): 256–270.
Dillender, Marcus. 2015a. “The Effect of Health Insurance on Workers’ Compensation Filing: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act’s Age-Based Threshold
for Dependent Coverage.” Journal of Health Economics 43: 204–228.
———. 2015b. “Health Insurance and Labor Force Participation: What Legal
Recognition Does for Same-Sex Couples.” Contemporary Economic Policy 33(2): 381–394.
Finkelstein, Amy, Sarah Taubman, Bill Wright, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan
Gruber, Joseph P. Newhouse, Heidi Allen, and Katherine Baicker. 2012.
“The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(3): 1057–1106.
Gruber, Jonathan, and Jeffrey Kubik. 2002. Health Insurance Coverage and
the Disability Insurance Application Decision. NBER Working Paper No.
9148. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Heaton, Paul. 2012. The Impact of Health Care Reform on Workers’ Compensation Medical Care. RAND Institute for Civil Justice Technical Report.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Hill, Steven C. 2012. “Individual Insurance Benefits to Be Available under
Health Reform Would Have Cut Out-of-Pocket Spending in 2001–08.”
Health Affairs 31(6): 1349–1356.
Hofer, Adam N., Jean Abraham, and Ira Moscovice. 2011. “Expansion of Cov-

100 Dillender
erage under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and Primary
Care Utilization.” Milbank Quarterly 89(1): 69–89.
Huang, Elbert S., and Kenneth Finegold. 2013. “Seven Million Americans
Live in Areas Where Demand for Primary Care May Exceed Supply by
More than 10 percent.” Health Affairs 32(3): 614–621.
Hunt, H. Allan, ed. 2004. Adequacy of Earnings Replacement in Workers’
Compensation Programs. Washington, DC: National Academy of Social
Insurance and Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
Kaiser Family Foundation. 2012. “A Guide to the Supreme Court’s Decision
on the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion.” Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation.
———. 2013. “Summary of the Affordable Care Act.” Last modified April 25,
2013. Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation.
———. 2014. “Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014.” Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. http://
kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding
-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/ (accessed September 4, 2015).
Kolstad, Jonathan T., and Amanda E. Kowalski. 2012. “Mandate-Based Health
Reform and the Labor Market: Evidence from the Massachusetts Reform.”
NBER Working Paper No. 17933. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Lakdawalla, Darius N., Robert T. Reville, and Seth A. Seabury. 2007. “How
Does Health Insurance Affect Workers’ Compensation Filing?” Economic
Inquiry 45(2): 286–303.
Maestas, Nicole, Kathleen Mullen, and Alexander Strand. 2014. “Disability Insurance and Health Insurance Reform: Evidence from Massachusetts.” American Economic Review: (Papers and Proceedings) 104(5):
329–335.
McInerney, Melissa, and Kosali Simon. 2012. “The Effect of State Workers’
Compensation Program Changes on the Use of Federal Social Security Disability Insurance.” Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 51(1): 57–88.
Michalopoulos, Charles, David Wittenburg, Dina A. R. Israel, and Anne
Warren. 2012. “The Effects of Health Care Benefits on Health Care Use and
Health: A Randomized Trial for Disability Insurance Beneficiaries.” Medical Care 50(9): 764–771.
Moulta-Ali, Umar. 2013. “Primer on Disability Benefits: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
Nyce, Steven, Sylvester J. Schieber, John B. Shoven, Sita Nataraj Slavov, and

The Potential Effects of the Affordable Care Act 101
David A. Wise. 2013. “Does Retiree Health Insurance Encourage Early
Retirement?” Journal of Public Economics 104: 40–51.
Riley, Gerald F. 2006. “Health Insurance and Access to Care among Social
Security Disability Insurance Beneficiaries during the Medicare Waiting
Period.” INQUIRY: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision,
and Financing 43(3): 222–230.
Schoen, Cathy, Michelle M. Doty, Ruth H. Robertson, and Sara R. Collins.
2011. “Affordable Care Act Reforms Could Reduce the Number of Underinsured U.S. Adults by 70 Percent.” Health Affairs 30(9): 1762–1771.
Sengupta, Ishita, Marjorie Baldwin, and Virginia Reno. 2013. Workers’ Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs. Washington, DC: National Academy of Social Insurance.
Social Security Administration. 2013. “Annual Statistical Supplement to the
Social Security Bulletin, 2013.” Washington, DC: Social Security Administration.
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2013/
supplement13.pdf (accessed September 4, 2015).
———. 2014a. SSI Federal Payment Amounts. Washington, DC: Social Security Administration. http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSIamts.html (accessed
September 4, 2015).
———. 2014b. “Social Security Disability Benefits.” SSA Publication No.
05-10029. Washington, DC: Social Security Administration. http://www
.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-05-10029.pdf (accessed September 4, 2015).
———. 2014c. Statistical Tables. Washington, DC: Social Security Administration. http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/ index.html. http://www.socialsecurity
.gov/OACT/STATS/ (accessed September 4, 2015).
———. 2014d. “2011 Annual Report of the SSI Program.” Washington,
DC: Social Security Administration. http://www.ssa.gov/oact/ssir/SSI11/
Participants.html#646860 (accessed September 4, 2015).
Sommers, Benjamin D., Thomas Musco, Kenneth Finegold, Munira Z. Gunja,
Amy Burke, and Audrey M. McDowell. 2014. “Health Reform and Changes
in Health Insurance Coverage in 2014.” New England Journal of Medicine 371(9): 867–874.
Strumpf, Erin. 2010. “Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance for Early Retirees: Impacts on Retirement, Health, and Health Care.” International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 10(2): 105–147.
Vaida, Bara. 2012. “The IPAB: The Center of a Political Clash over How to
Change Medicare.” Kaiser Health News. Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation. http://khn.org/news/ipab-faq (accessed September 4,
2015).
Weathers II, Robert R., and Michelle Stegman. 2012. “The Effect of Expanding
Access to Health Insurance on the Health and Mortality of Social Security

102 Dillender
Disability Insurance Beneficiaries.” Journal of Health Economics 31(6):
863–875.
Zuckerman, Stephen. 2010. “What Are the Provisions in the New Law
for Containing Costs and How Effective Will They Be?” Washington,
DC: Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412194-ppaca
-containing-costs.pdf (accessed September 4, 2015).

6
The Economic Challenges of
the Community Living Assistance
Services and Supports Act
Edward C. Norton
University of Michigan and National Bureau of Economic Research

The most controversial part of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA) is the mandate that individuals purchase health insurance. The individual mandate is justified on economic grounds to avoid
an adverse selection death spiral in the individual health insurance market. The constitutionality of the individual mandate was challenged in
court, with the plaintiffs arguing that the government could not compel
individuals to participate in a market. However, the Supreme Court narrowly upheld the constitutionality of the individual mandate, allowing
that part of the ACA to continue to be implemented gradually.
Lost from much of the public discourse about the ACA was that a
major component of the original act—one that encouraged a special
form of health insurance but not through a mandate—was dropped by
the government and will not be implemented. The Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act would have created a market for long-term care insurance, called the CLASS program. The
goal was to provide assistance to working-age individuals who had
difficulty performing daily activities and required long-term care services. The CLASS program was decidedly different from the ACA’s
approach to standard health insurance because it was to be voluntary
and entirely self-financed; no one questioned its constitutionality. It was
also extremely important politically in getting the entire ACA passed
because it improved the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) 10-year
economic forecast for the entire act.
Despite the lack of controversy surrounding its constitutionality,
the Senate Appropriations Committee eliminated funding for the design
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and marketing of the CLASS program in the fall of 2011 (Gleckman
2011). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) disbanded the CLASS program office, and the then-secretary Kathleen
Sebelius stopped efforts to design the program. Congress has no plans
to rescue it.
Why was the CLASS program dropped? What economic challenges
did it face, given that it was not challenged on constitutional grounds?
What is the proper role of government in providing an insurance market? This chapter addresses these questions.

BACKGROUND ISSUES
The greatest financial uncertainty for the elderly is not for food,
pharmaceuticals, or even inpatient care, it is for long-term care (Norton,
Wang, and Stearns 2006). The financial burden of long-term care (either
nursing home care or home health care) can be large because insurance
coverage is often modest, and because care can continue for a decade
or more. Medicare insurance is quite complete for inpatient care, outpatient care, and pharmaceuticals, especially when considering Medigap
and Medicaid policies that help with copayments and deductibles. But
Medicare coverage of long-term care is quite limited and requires substantial cost sharing. This leaves long-term care as the greatest expenditure risk.
It is hard to predict years in advance who will need nursing home
care. Some may die before they need care; others will lose their spouses,
their health, and then their independence. When there is high financial risk and difficulty in predicting who will need benefits, there is an
opportunity for private insurance.
Despite the apparent demand for long-term care insurance for the
elderly, there are many reasons private long-term care insurance is seldom sold. This has been discussed extensively in the literature (see,
e.g., Brown and Finkelstein [2007, 2011]; Frank [2012]; and Norton
[2000]). Here is a brief summary of the most important reasons the
private insurance market is small. Adverse selection means that those
who are most likely to need long-term care are most likely to want to
buy it; insurance companies may target individuals who statistically are
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least likely to need it. Moral hazard is also often a problem in insurance
markets. For long-term care there is both standard moral hazard and a
version proposed by Pauly (1990), in which elderly people do not buy
insurance so that their children, the presumed future decision makers,
will not put them in a nursing home. Loading (administrative) costs are
high because most sales are made to individuals and because adverse
selection requires background and health checks. Medicaid is a close
substitute for part of the population who would qualify for Medicaid
quickly. Insurance companies now offer capped daily benefits, instead
of paying a fraction of the cost (like most other health insurance),
because of the difficulty in predicting future nursing home costs (Cutler
1996). This reduces the insurance value of the product and lowers its
desirability. Some elderly people greatly underestimate their own risk
of needing long-term care, again lowering demand (Frank 2012). Given
all these reasons combined, it is perhaps a wonder anyone buys longterm care insurance.
The target population for the CLASS program was working-age
adults who face a small risk of disability during their working years.
This population is younger on average than those who first consider
purchasing long-term care insurance. While the specifics of financial
uncertainty and lack of insurance are slightly different than for the older
population insuring against the need for nursing home care, the main
themes apply to this younger population. If someone becomes disabled
to a degree that they cannot work or live independently, then she faces
enormous financial risks. Having a steady supply of cash could make
the difference between remaining independent at home and going to an
institution, but currently there is not an adequate private market for this.
Presumably, the same issues of adverse selection, moral hazard, loading, competition from close substitutes, and misperceptions also apply.
An alternative to formal long-term care (nursing home and home
health care) is informal care, unpaid care that is typically provided by
close relatives (Grabowski, Norton, and Van Houtven 2012). Studies
have shown that receiving informal care can reduce formal home health
and nursing home use and cost (Van Houtven and Norton 2004, 2008).
Informal caregivers may not only help keep loved ones out of nursing
homes, they also may enjoy time with their relatives and set a good
example for the next generation. However, there can be costs too. The
caregiver may need to quit his job or work reduced hours, and the care-
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giver’s own health may suffer during the course of helping others (Coe
and Van Houtven 2009; Do et al. 2014).
When there is no private market for something that some people
clearly desire, there may be room for the government to step in and
create a market. Justification would depend on whether the government
can overcome existing market failures. Given this background, there is
clearly room for discussion about the possible role of government in
creating a market for long-term care insurance.

THE CLASS ACT
The CLASS Act was Title VIII of the ACA. The purpose was to
provide a cash benefit for nonmedical care and for support to help people live in the community. The cash benefit could have been used to
purchase home health care, to reimburse relatives for their time, or to
purchase other support. One goal was to keep people out of expensive
nursing homes and thereby keep them in their homes, where they are
generally happier. Another goal was to reduce government expenditures
on long-term care. For critical summaries of the CLASS Act, see Miller
(2011) and Wiener (2012).
The CLASS program was one form of consumer-directed longterm care services and was related to the policy of cash and counseling, which provides both cash to needy elderly persons with no strings
attached and also counseling about effective ways to spend the cash.
Again, the goals of cash and counseling programs were to keep people
in their homes and lower the cost of long-term care. Cash and counseling demonstration programs in three states began in 1998 (Doty,
Mahoney, and Sciegaj 2010) and are now used in several states (San
Antonio et al. 2010; Simon-Rusinowitz et al. 2010) and in several other
countries (Low et al. 2012; Nadash et al. 2012).
The two key features of the CLASS program were in stark contrast to the standard health insurance policy in the ACA: it was voluntary and self-financed. Because no one would have been compelled to
buy it, there was no debate over the constitutionality of the policy. Of
course, this was potentially a great weakness of the CLASS Act—if not
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enough healthy people signed up for it, it would not have been financially sustainable.
Being self-financed, the CLASS program would not have been
subsidized from general tax revenues; all benefits would have been
paid from premiums. Furthermore, the program was required to be
financially sustainable for at least 75 years. This politically important
requirement imposed tough conditions on running the program. Longrun financial solvency is hard to maintain, as will be discussed below.
There were several other important provisions about benefits in the
CLASS Act. Premiums were to be used for consumer-directed services,
meaning that the consumer would decide how to spend the money, similar to cash and counseling programs. For example, the money could
have been used to pay for informal care by a son or daughter. The benefit, by statute, had to be at least $50 per day, but it could also have
been adjusted by the level of disability. There were no lifetime limits
on benefits. Additional benefits included advocacy and financial advice.
The CLASS program insurance had no underwriting, meaning
that premiums were not adjusted for risk, such as for health status or
chronic conditions; all persons of the same age paid the same premium.
A healthy person in a low-risk job would pay the same premium as a
chronically disabled person who is waiting for the end of the vesting
period to start collecting benefits. Therefore, the actuarial value of the
insurance is high for a person with a high risk of needing the insurance,
and low for a person with low risk. The low actuarial value for persons
with low risk contributes greatly to the problem of adverse selection
because demand for such insurance depends on the actuarial value of
what is being purchased.
Eligibility for receiving benefits from the CLASS Act had two conditions, beyond signing up and paying premiums. First, a person would
have to pay into the system for at least five years before being eligible
to receive any benefits. This was an extraordinarily long vesting period
for individual insurance and was necessary because of concerns about
adverse selection. The other condition for eligibility is that during the
vesting period the person had to be working. However, the definition of
working had a low bar—annual earnings of at least $1,200. Even working at minimum wage, it would take fewer than four hours per week to
earn the minimum.
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Despite the length of the written legislation, the ACA left many
important details to be worked out after passage. The HHS secretary
was charged with determining many specific details within the broad
parameters outlined in the ACA. For example, eligibility was to be
determined primarily by disability level, but the details of what that
level would be (such as activities of daily living or mental health) were
up to the secretary. Eligibility could have also potentially changed if the
person did in fact enter a nursing home or hospital or become Medicaid
eligible. For example, if the one goal of the CLASS Act were to reduce
admissions to nursing homes, why should someone receive the cash
benefit after admission? By law, the benefit level needed to be at least
$50 per day. The cash benefits could have been adjusted for the level
of disability. Also unspecified was whether there would be differences
by financial need at the time, by family status or geographic location.
Although the premiums were not allowed to be risk adjusted, it was
left open whether premiums would be adjusted for income (or wealth),
student status, or marital status. The big unknown was the price elasticity for premiums—if it was high, then small increases in the premium
would have large detrimental effects on enrollment, revenues, and longrun financial stability.
Had the CLASS Act been implemented, it would have been rolled
out on a timetable roughly similar to the rest of the ACA. The HHS secretary was due to release rules for eligibility and enrollment in January
2012. By October 2012 the secretary was to announce benefit design
and premiums. People could have begun purchasing insurance by 2014.
However, in the fall of 2011, the secretary announced that the CLASS
program would not be implemented (Gleckman 2011).
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scores every proposed
piece of legislation over a 10-year horizon to see what the net financial effect will be on the national budget. A positive score means that
the legislation will save more money than it will spend. Because of
proposed expansions to Medicaid and subsidies to purchase individual
health insurance, there was concern that the overall score for the ACA
would be negative. The CLASS Act was existing legislation that could
be added to the rest of the ACA. Most importantly, it was sure to have a
positive score over a 10-year period. The act’s five-year vesting period
ensures that people pay in for many years before receiving benefits.
So, over a 10-year horizon (especially with a few years of start up at
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the beginning), the CLASS Act was sure to improve the overall CBO
score. This is one way that the act became important politically in the
development of the ACA.
The CBO had to make reasonable assumptions about how the program would be run, such as that the average monthly premium would
be $123 and that the average daily benefit would be $75. It assumed
modest reductions in Medicaid payments on long-term care, and also
that the program would remain solvent over a 75-year period. With
those assumptions, the CBO estimated that the CLASS Act alone would
reduce the federal deficit by $74 billion over 10 years. This was roughly
half of the total projected savings of $138 billion for the entire ACA.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
The CLASS program faced formidable economic challenges. The
goal was to create an insurance product that provided needed services
to the general public while also remaining financially viable in the long
run. The legislation set certain parameters—particularly on benefits,
eligibility, and underwriting—that made it impossible to succeed. In
this section I review the economic challenges with designing such a
system and why the program was doomed to fail.
The first question is, why should the government be involved in this
market at all? Why not leave it to the private sector? If it were possible
to sell an insurance product to the general population and make money
(the basic terms and conditions of the CLASS Act), the private market
would figure out how to do it. And if the private market cannot sell an
insurance product at a profit under these terms, the government would
need to think hard about whether a public solution could work when a
private solution cannot.
There is a modest-sized private market for long-term care insurance, but it is now shrinking. To be clear, this private market is aimed at
providing insurance for the elderly against the risk of paying for nursing
home care and home health care. This risk grows rapidly after age 70.
The CLASS Act, in contrast, aims to provide services for working-age
adults who become disabled, although the benefits could continue into
old age. Therefore, while most of the issues are similar, the target audi-
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ence for typical private long-term care insurance is slightly different
than for the CLASS program.
Given the large and variable out-of-pocket expenditure risk faced
by working-age adults, why is the private market so small? There are
many reasons why insurance markets can fail. I review in more detail
the list of reasons for the failure of the long-term care insurance market discussed before, and I further explore to what extent these reasons
apply to the CLASS program. The two general problems for nearly all
insurance markets are adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse
selection is a problem for private long-term care insurance if the bad
risks are more likely to try to purchase insurance. An individual is likely
to know more about her own health and health behaviors than the insurance company, such as risk of injury at work, family medical history
(how long did her parents and other relatives live, and what were the
causes of death?), household income and wealth, and family relationships (would a daughter be likely to provide informal care?). Adverse
selection problems are mitigated somewhat by the long time horizon
(what will happen to health, behaviors, and family status in 30 years?)
and by the fact that, given demographics, the insurance company knows
the actuarial risks extremely well. “Moral hazard” refers to a change in
behavior after a person purchases insurance because the price of care is
lower for an insured person. Unlike insurance for nursing home care,
where few people desire to live in such a facility, for the working-age
population cash benefits have high value.
For the CLASS program market, both adverse selection and moral
hazard were likely to be even bigger problems than for the elderly longterm care insurance market. Any working-age adult with a chronic disability would have immediately signed up for the program. This problem was clearly foremost in the minds of the legislators who drafted
this legislation because of the five-year vesting period, an astonishingly
long time for any form of insurance. Moral hazard would also be a big
problem because the benefit could be used in a wide variety of ways,
including giving the cash to family members. Who would not want such
a benefit?
There are cases where private markets break down, leaving a role
for government intervention (Norton and Newhouse 1994). In such
cases, government policy may have had the ability to surmount these
problems in a way that the private market cannot. For example, one
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way to overcome moral hazard is to require broad participation. The
ACA mandates insurance purchase (or a fine) to ensure broad participation of all, including the healthy, thereby combating adverse selection.
However, participation was strictly voluntary for the CLASS program.
Therefore, the government did not use any coercive means to combat
adverse selection and relied instead on marketing campaigns to encourage enrollment by the relatively young and healthy. The restriction on
underwriting makes adverse selection even worse. By not pricing the
insurance to reflect expected costs (other than age), it is then relatively
inexpensive for those chronically ill and relatively expensive for those
who are healthy. This pricing encourages purchase by those most likely
to use it and discourages purchase by those least likely to use it. There
is a reason that insurance companies want to adjust premiums to reflect
expected costs. When that pricing strategy is not allowed, it encourages
adverse selection and will quickly undermine the financial viability of
the insurance.
One way that the CLASS program would probably have had a competitive edge over private market rivals is through loading, or administrative overhead, which adds to the premium and makes the insurance
attractive only to those who are quite risk averse. The load for private
long-term care insurance has been estimated to be about 32 percent
(Brown and Finkelstein 2011). It is high because it is mostly sold to
individuals, with brokers receiving high commission fees. The government presumably could have sold the insurance with lower overhead,
which lowers the premium and raises the value of the insurance, thereby
increasing demand.
An additional challenge to the CLASS Act insurance was that it
would have competed with a variety of products that are partial substitutes. Social Security pays disability benefits to people who have
worked but now have a medical condition expected to last at least a
year. Worker’s compensation pays benefits to workers injured on the
job. Medicaid provides both health insurance and long-term care insurance to people who meet their state’s eligibility requirements, and those
can include working-age adults with disabilities who have low incomes.
And many people who need care assume (often correctly) that they can
rely on their spouse, family, or extended family to provide long-term
care services if they are ever needed. Alternative forms of insurance
lower the demand for another substitute insurance product.
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The long time span from initial purchase to ultimate use of benefits causes several problems for this insurance market. One of these is
nondiversifiable intertemporal risk (Cutler 1996; Norton 2000). Longterm care insurance is usually for the future, not the upcoming year,
as with regular health insurance. There are two big unknowns about
expenditure risk in, say, 30 years: probability of use and price. The risk
of probability of use can be diversified over a large general population.
The price risk (what will the cost of home health care be in 30 years?)
cannot be diversified across the population; large price increases affect
everyone. Insurance companies do not like to take on nondiversifiable
risk. Several decades ago, long-term care insurance companies switched
from paying a percentage of fees (like most regular health insurance) to
paying a flat daily fee. The capitated per diem limits the insurance company’s exposure to the risk of price inflation. However, it also greatly
reduces the value of purchasing insurance and hence lowers demand.
The CLASS Act offers a capitated per diem benefit (perhaps adjusted
for disability level). This means that the insurance protects against the
extensive margin of any use but not the risk of intensive margin of the
amount of use. That is, if the benefit is $50 per day and you need $200
to live independently, you are not protected for the extra $150.
Another problem with the long time horizon is that over an extended
period, some people may lapse their premium payments. This could be
due to the loss of the means to pay, a change in mind about the value
of continuing to purchase the insurance, or simple forgetfulness. For
private long-term care insurance, lapse in payment is a wonderful thing.
When someone lapses, they forfeit past payments, which become pure
profits to the company. Lapsed policies have been an important part of
the business model of selling long-term care insurance. When a policy
lapses, then the individual has to start over, like a new customer, at a
higher price appropriate for her current age. In fact, one reason many
insurance companies are no longer selling new long-term care insurance policies is that the lapse rates have declined, squeezing margins.
Politically, the federal government could not encourage lapses as a way
to keep the CLASS program solvent. The CLASS Act had a provision
to allow a person to reenroll at a higher premium after lapsing, but
there was a tricky balance. Minimizing lapses reduces financial viability. Also, if the policy on lapses is too weak, allowing people to skip
payments during down times, there is the possibility for abuse.
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To be successful, the CLASS program would have needed many
healthy low-risk people to enroll. One way to increase enrollment
would have been to encourage employers to offer the insurance as part
of the benefit package. Getting the word out through large employers, and having people make decisions about the CLASS program at
the same time as other benefit decisions, would undoubtedly increase
enrollment. Another way to increase enrollment through employers
would have been to offer it as an opt-out benefit. That is, the default
would be to have employees signed up, although an employee could
opt out by actively making a choice. Studies of benefit choice have
shown that employees tend to go with default choices and tend to stick
with past choices (Madrian and Shea 2001). An opt-out system offered
through employers would dramatically increase enrollment; however, it
is not clear whether employers would want to encourage employees to
take up this insurance.
The legal status of premiums paid by the employee and collected
by the employer complicates employers’ ability to offer CLASS program insurance. Legally, if an employee has Social Security and other
federal benefits deducted from their paychecks, then they get credit for
having paid them; the employer is responsible for turning the premiums over to the IRS. If the employer is negligent in paying the IRS,
then the employee is not held responsible. However, the legal status of
the CLASS program premiums was different. Unless the IRS modified
its rules, an employer could have collected premiums for the CLASS
program and not turned them over, and the employee would be held
responsible. Presumably the IRS could have amended its policies, but
that did not happen.
Finally, there was the big unanswered question about what would
happen if, down the road, the CLASS Act was later declared financially
unstable. Suppose, for example, that the CLASS Act went into effect,
and for its first 20 years was deemed financially solvent in the long run.
But then, for some unfixable reason in the twenty-first year it was no
longer financially solvent over the 75-year time horizon, as required
by Congress. What would happen to everyone’s premiums? Would
people get them back? Would they get them back with interest? Forfeit
everything? I asked several policymakers that question and never got
an answer. No one wanted to talk about that possibility. Yet, I think the
lack of an answer was important in undermining the financial feasibil-
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ity of the CLASS Act. Why should I invest in something that is known
to be financially risky if I do not know what will happen to my investment? If the CLASS Act promised to reimburse all enrollees, it would
make the initial investment in the insurance more financially attractive.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the CLASS Act offered an insurance policy that was
extremely expensive for relatively healthy people and thereby discouraged enrollment due to adverse selection. It did not protect against one
major form of risk (risk of future price inflation), and it was unclear
what would happen to paid premiums if the program were to be declared
financially unstable in the long run. Having lower loading would not
make up for the other fiscal problems. Given the constraints, the CLASS
Act could never be financially solvent or fiscally responsible.
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7
The Role of Private Health
Insurance in the Medicare Program
M. Kate Bundorf
Stanford University

Medicare, the federal program that provides health insurance for
aged and disabled people, is popular in the United States. While the
majority of Americans report that they prefer spending cuts to higher
taxes to reduce the government deficit, fewer than one in five support
major reductions to Medicare (Kaiser Family Foundation 2011). But
Medicare is expensive. In 2012, program expenditures totaled $574 billion—over $12,000 for each person enrolled (Lew et al. 2013). Medicare spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) is forecasted
to increase from 3.6 percent in 2012 to 5.8 percent by 2035 as growth in
Medicare spending continues to outpace growth in GDP. Between 2008
and 2012, approximately half of the growth in Medicare spending was
driven by increasing utilization per beneficiary, and half was driven by
rising enrollment due to the aging of the population (Chandra, Holmes,
and Skinner 2013).
Devoting a greater share of resources to health care is not in itself
necessarily problematic. Most economists believe that technological change has been the key driver of the persistent rise in health care
spending both in the United States and in other countries (Fuchs 1996),
and technological innovation in areas such as cardiovascular care, neonatal intensive care, and the treatment of mental health conditions has
dramatically improved health and well-being for many (Cutler 2004).
In other words, health care spending is often “worth it” in the sense
that the benefits we gain from health care services exceed their cost.
Higher spending on health care is also a natural consequence of rising
income. As people become wealthier, they devote a greater share of
their incomes to health care as the incremental value they receive from
other types of consumption declines (Hall and Jones 2007).
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In the context of the Medicare program, however, current spending
levels are problematic for two reasons. First, Medicare is financed primarily through taxes, and program spending is a key driver of the $1.2
trillion U.S. federal budget deficit. Between 1973 and 2012, the percentage of the federal budget devoted to Medicare increased from 3.7
percent to 15.6 percent, and Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security
account for the vast majority of the projected growth of federal spending over the next decade (Congressional Budget Office 2013).
A more fundamental issue, however, is whether the current amount
spent on Medicare produces enough value. A large body of literature documenting differences across geographic areas in the use of
Medicare-financed services points to substantial inefficiency in the
delivery of Medicare-financed services (Institute of Medicine 2013).
Area-level spending differences do not appear to be explained by differences in health status of beneficiaries (Fisher et al. 2003; MedPAC
2011), and beneficiaries in high-use areas do not appear to be more
satisfied with their care or have better patient outcomes (Baicker and
Chandra 2004; Fisher et al. 2003; Skinner, Staiger, and Fisher 2006).
Based on these types of studies, researchers have estimated that 20–30
percent of Medicare spending provides little to no improvement in
health (Institute of Medicine 2011). In short, not only does there exist
enormous opportunity to provide Medicare-financed services more efficiently, but reducing the rate of growth of Medicare spending is essential for fiscal stability.
Very few Medicare beneficiaries rely solely on the traditional
Medicare program for insurance coverage. Because Medicare has
relatively high deductibles and cost sharing for covered services and
does not include long-term or dental care, most beneficiaries supplement their Medicare coverage with additional private or public insurance. State Medicaid programs provide publicly financed supplemental coverage for approximately 20 percent of beneficiaries with low
incomes and modest assets, and approximately 30 percent of beneficiaries receive supplemental insurance from a former employer,
although employer-sponsored retiree coverage is expected to decline
dramatically since the number of employers offering retiree health
insurance to current workers has declined sharply in recent years
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2012).
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Those without coverage from either Medicaid or former employers
rely on highly regulated private insurance markets. Medicare Part C,
or Medicare Advantage (MA), is a voluntary, private replacement for
traditional Medicare, whereas Medigap is a private, individual policy
that supplements Medicare. These two systems—private insurance
supplementing and private insurance replacing a publicly funded benefit—represent alternative models for how public and private insurance
interact. This chapter examines these different approaches and identifies the implications for Medicare reform.

MEDICARE: THE BASICS
Medicare provides health insurance for adults aged 65 and over and
for younger people with disabilities, permanent kidney failure (endstage renal disease), or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig’s disease). In 2012, Medicare covered 60 percent of the population—42.1
million aged 65 or older and 8.5 million disabled—and program expenditures totaled $574.2 billion (22 percent of national health spending)
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2012; Lew et al. 2013). Prior to Medicare’s
establishment in 1965, roughly half of older adults in the United States
had health insurance; now, nearly all have coverage (Moon 1996). The
federal program is funded primarily through taxes and is administered
by the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS), which functions as a public insurer, paying for services from private providers on
behalf of Medicare beneficiaries. In 2012, Medicare covered 16 percent
of the population and financed 22 percent of national health spending.
Medicare is technically composed of four distinct parts, referred to
as parts A–D. Parts A and B, which were established when Medicare
was enacted in 1965, were modeled after the typical types of insurance
coverage available in the private market at the time. Part A, the Hospital
Insurance program, covers inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing
facilities, hospice care, and some home health care. In 2013, Medicare
beneficiaries paid a deductible of $1,184 for the first 60 days in the
hospital and $296 per day in coinsurance for days 61–90. For years in
which beneficiaries use more than 90 inpatient days, they have 60 “life-
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time reserve days” with coinsurance of $592 per day. After the reserve
days are used, beneficiaries pay all costs of additional hospital inpatient
care. Part B, part of the Supplementary Medical Insurance program,
covers physician, outpatient, home health, and preventive services. In
2013, the deductible for Part B services was $147, and beneficiaries
paid 20 percent of the Medicare-approved amount for most physician
services.
Part A is funded by a payroll tax, and most people do not pay a
premium when they enroll. Part B, in contrast, is funded by general
tax revenues and beneficiary premiums. The monthly premium in 2013
was $104.90 for most beneficiaries but was higher for beneficiaries
with incomes exceeding $85,000 for those filing individual income tax
returns and $170,000 for those filing jointly. The vast majority of people who enroll in Part A also enroll in Part B, likely because the value
to the beneficiary of the benefits is high relative to the cost and because
the process of enrolling is administratively straightforward (Remler and
Glied 2003). In this chapter, we refer to the combination of Parts A and
B as “traditional Medicare.”
Part C, also known as the Medicare Advantage program (MA),
allows beneficiaries to enroll in a private health insurance plan as an
alternative to the traditional Part A and Part B benefits. A participating
private plan agrees to provide Medicare-covered services for beneficiaries and receives a payment from Medicare on behalf of each enrollee.
Part D, a highly subsidized outpatient prescription drug benefit,
was established by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. The benefit is delivered exclusively by private insurers, and beneficiaries must
actively enroll in a private plan in order to obtain coverage. Insurers
may offer Part D benefits as stand-alone plans or as part of an MA plan.
Part D plans also charge beneficiaries premiums for enrolling, and the
premiums vary across plans. Enrollee premiums are waived, however,
for very low-income beneficiaries, and higher-income beneficiaries
must pay an additional monthly premium. Although Part D is clearly an
important component of Medicare coverage, in this chapter we focus
on Parts A and B, which provide medical as opposed to pharmaceutical
coverage.
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MEDICARE AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE
Traditional Medicare coverage, the combination of Parts A and B,
is characterized by broad access to health care providers and relatively
high cost sharing. Most health care providers participate in Medicare,
and beneficiaries with Parts A and B are free to seek care from any
physician, in contrast to most private plans serving the under-65 market, which restrict coverage to a limited set of providers. Due to its
relatively high cost sharing, however, the Medicare basic benefit is substantively less generous than typical employer-sponsored coverage, and
the cap on benefits for inpatient care exposes beneficiaries to significant
financial risk (MedPAC 2011). On average, Medicare covers 64 percent
of beneficiary spending on health care services for noninstitutionalized
beneficiaries, and annual out-of-pocket liabilities average over $15,000
for the top 2 percent of spenders (MedPAC 2011).
Relatively few beneficiaries, however, are exposed to the costsharing provisions of the basic benefit, since most have supplemental
insurance. The Medicare program offers two models of how private insurance interacts with publicly funded coverage: insurance supplementing
publicly funded coverage (Medigap) and insurance replacing publicly
funded coverage (MA). For both types of coverage, private plans compete for enrollees in markets highly regulated at the federal level.
Medigap
A market for private insurance supplementing Medicare quickly
emerged after the introduction of Medicare in 1965, and state regulation
soon followed in response to marketing abuses by some insurers and
concerns over the ability of Medicare beneficiaries to make informed
decisions about private coverage (Cafferata 1985). Many states introduced laws requiring minimum standards for nongroup Medigap policies in the 1970s, and in 1980 Congress passed legislation encouraging
greater state-level regulation through a system of voluntary certification
of Medicare supplemental policies (Government Accountability Office
1986; McCall, Rice, and Hall 1987; McCall, Rice, and Sangl 1986).
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990, which shifted much of
the responsibility for regulation of the Medigap market from the state
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to the federal level and made requirements mandatory rather than voluntary, created the basic regulatory framework under which the market
currently operates (Fox, Rice, and Alecxih 1995). The act mandated
standardized benefits by restricting the sale of insurance supplementing Medicare to a set of 10 predefined plans, identified as plans A–J,
and created a six-month open enrollment period for 65-year-olds
newly entering the program, requiring guaranteed issue and prohibiting the use of health information in rate setting during this period
(McCormack et al. 1996). The set of standardized plans that insurers
are allowed to offer has changed somewhat over time, and, with the
introduction of Medicare Part D, plans covering prescription drugs are
no longer sold.
Medigap insurance helps beneficiaries pay for some of the health
care costs that traditional Medicare does not cover. Table 7.1 describes
the types of Medigap plans that insurers are permitted to sell. The plans
cover primarily the coinsurance and deductibles associated with Parts A
and B. In particular, all plans are required to cover Part A coinsurance,
as well as up to 365 additional hospital days after Medicare-covered
hospital days have been used. All plans also cover either all or some of
the coinsurance or copayments for Medicare Part B services. The most
popular plans, C and F, also cover the Part A and Part B deductibles.
Medicare Advantage
The main alternative to Medigap insurance is a Part C private plan
(Medicare Advantage). The Medicare Advantage program was established by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 and
aimed to both expand the types of coverage available to Medicare
beneficiaries and lower Medicare spending (McGuire, Newhouse,
and Sinaiko 2011). The act authorized Medicare to contract with private plans to provide Medicare-covered services for beneficiaries and
allowed Medicare enrollees to replace traditional Medicare with coverage from a qualified private plan. Participating plans sign an annual
contract with the CMS, agreeing to provide benefits to beneficiaries
and receive a capitated payment from the CMS for each beneficiary
who enrolls. Historically, the CMS linked plan payments to the level
of Medicare spending among fee-for-service enrollees in a geographic
area, setting payments at 95 percent of the adjusted average per capita

Table 7.1 Medigap Plans
Medigap benefits (%)
Medicare Part A coinsurance and hospital costs
up to an additional 365 days after Medicare
benefits are used up
Medicare Part B coinsurance or copayment
Blood (first 3 pints)
Part A hospice care coinsurance or copayment
Skilled nursing facility care coinsurance
Medicare Part A deductible
Medicare Part B deductible
Medicare Part B excess charges
Foreign travel emergency (up to plan limits)

A
100

B
100

C
100

D
100

Fa
100

G
100

Kb
100

Lb
100

M
100

Nc
100

100
100
100

100
100
100

100
100
100
100
100
100

100
100
100
100
100

100
100
100
100
100

50
50
50
50
50

75
75
75
75
75

100
100
100
100
50

100c
100
100
100
100

100

100

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

100

100

100

100
100

Plan F also offers a high-deductible plan. If you choose this option, you must pay for Medicare-covered costs up to the deductible amount
of $2,110 in 2013 before your Medigap plan pays anything.
b
For Plans K and L, after you meet your out-of-pocket yearly limit and your yearly Part B deductible ($147 in 2013), the Medigap plan
pays 100% of covered services for the rest of the calendar year. The out-of-pocket limit for Plan K is $4,800; for Plan L it is $2,400.
c
Plan N pays 100% of the Part B coinsurance, except for a copayment of up to $20 for some office visits and up to a $50 copayment for
emergency room visits that don’t result in an inpatient admission.
a
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cost in the county and adjusting the payment for each enrollee for certain demographic characteristics (Pope et al. 2004).
Plans must provide a minimum level of benefits equivalent to that
of Medicare and often provide additional benefits, such as lower cost
sharing and additional covered services. As in the under 65 market,
most MA plans contract with a limited set of providers in a given area.
Thus, when choosing between the traditional Medicare program and an
MA plan, beneficiaries are generally exchanging lower cost sharing for
restrictions on provider access. While plans may charge beneficiaries a
premium for enrolling, within a given service area, the premium must
not vary by beneficiary characteristics.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and subsequent legislation made
a variety of changes to the program, including allowing types of plans
other than HMOs to participate, changing the plan payment formula
to encourage plans to enter in historically low-payment geographic
areas, and requiring the CMS to improve its risk-adjustment methods (McGuire, Newhouse, and Sinaiko 2011). The act also extended
the federal open enrollment period for Medigap plans to beneficiaries
involuntarily disenrolling from MA plans under certain conditions such
as the withdrawal of a plan from the market.

HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE USE OF MEDICAL CARE
This section discusses some basic principles in the economics of
insurance design, and the next section will apply these concepts in the
context of private insurance interacting with the Medicare program.
While the main purpose of insurance is to protect consumers from financial risk associated with poor health, it can also affect patient incentives when seeking treatment. Getting sick or having an accident can be
unpredictable, and the associated medical care is often very expensive.
A person purchasing health insurance exchanges an upfront premium
payment for compensation for medical care expenses if she gets sick
in the future. People who are risk averse benefit from the reduction in
uncertainty in their future financial resources.
When patients are fully reimbursed for their medical care spending, however, they and their physicians have little incentive to consider
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the cost of care when choosing among alternative treatments. In other
words, by reducing the price of using medical care, insurance creates
incentives for patients to use more care and more expensive care (Pauly
1968). Economists refer to this phenomenon as “moral hazard”—
people behave differently when they have insurance than when they do
not. The theoretical problem associated with moral hazard is not just
that patients use more care, but that they use care that is costly relative
to its benefits.
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment, a large randomized, controlled trial of the effects of health insurance on health care utilization
and spending conducted in the 1970s, demonstrated that this effect is
quantitatively important (Newhouse 1993). The study investigators randomly assigned people to health insurance plans with differing levels of
cost sharing and then carefully tracked the quantity and type of medical
care they used. People randomized to a 95 percent coinsurance plan—in
other words, those who paid for nearly all their health care expenditures
out of pocket—had 39 percent lower health care spending than those
randomized to a “free care” plan that provided full coverage (AronDine, Einav, and Finklestein 2013). While the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment is considered the “gold standard” for estimating the effects
of insurance coverage on the use of medical care owing to its rigorous study design, a large body of subsequent research using alternative
methods reinforces the basic finding that more generous insurance coverage leads to greater utilization of medical care.
While moral hazard is simply the result of people responding to
the financial incentives created by insurance, this type of behavior ultimately drives up health care spending. Because health insurance premiums reflect expected spending on covered services, increased utilization due to moral hazard is ultimately passed back to consumers in the
form of higher premiums. In the case of private health insurance markets, higher premiums due to moral hazard make health insurance less
affordable, resulting in fewer people purchasing coverage (Chernew,
Cutler, and Keenan 2005). In the case of publicly financed care, the
incremental cost is ultimately borne by taxpayers in the form of higher
taxes or lower government spending on other types of services.
Because spending on low-value services ultimately makes coverage
less attractive to consumers, private insurers have incentives to develop
strategies to encourage patients and their providers to use care effi-
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ciently. One mechanism to control moral hazard in the use of insured
health care is to require payments on the part of patients at the point
of service. In other words, instead of fully reimbursing patients for the
services they use, an insurer requires the patient to pay a portion of the
amount billed by the provider at the point of service. The objective of
this type of coinsurance or copayment is to reduce the use of low-value
care by creating incentives for patients to consider the cost as well as
the benefits of care when making treatment decisions.
Patient cost sharing, however, raises two types of concerns. First, it
erodes the amount of protection that insurance provides. In other words,
for consumers who initially purchased health insurance to protect themselves from financial risk, cost sharing at the point of service reintroduces financial risk associated with the use of health care. The optimal level of cost sharing balances these opposing effects (Zeckhauser
1970); patients give up some risk protection in exchange for lower
premiums, reflecting less moral hazard in utilization. The second concern is that patients may not effectively discriminate between low- and
high-value services when responding to cost sharing. Indeed, the Rand
Health Insurance Experiment found that patients did not effectively discriminate between more and less appropriate care when reducing utilization (Newhouse 1993), and several studies have documented that
patients with chronic conditions often discontinue the use of essential
drugs in response to cost sharing, sometimes resulting in higher subsequent rates of hospitalization (Swartz 2010). In response, analysts have
proposed differentiating the cost sharing for particular services based
on the benefits relative to the costs. In particular, services for which the
benefits are high relative to the costs would have low- or no-cost sharing (Fendrick et al. 2001).
Another mechanism that insurers use to influence utilization patterns is the structure of their relationships with providers. This type of
mechanism, which is often referred to as managed care, includes a range
of activities that are intended to influence how physicians, hospitals,
and other types of providers deliver care. For example, hospitals and
physicians can be paid in many different ways, ranging from a fee for
each service they provide to a capitated payment for each patient under
their care for a given time period. Fee-for-service payment, when the
fee exceeds the marginal cost of care, creates incentives for hospitals
and physicians to provide many services. Under capitation, in contrast,
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providers have incentives to do less. While these examples represent
two extremes, more generally, insurers can influence provider behavior
by designing payment systems that reward them financially for certain
types of activities and penalize them for others. Insurers may also use
nonfinancial mechanisms, such as giving physicians feedback on the
utilization patterns of their patients relative to those of their peers or
monitoring how their treatment patterns compare to clinical guidelines.
Insurers adopting managed care mechanisms also usually contract with
a subset of providers in a particular market.
Although the goal of managed care is to provide higher-quality and
lower-cost care by discouraging the use of low-value services, similar
to cost sharing, managed care mechanisms can pose some risks for consumers. The incentives that plans use to reduce the use of low-value care
may also reduce the use of high-value care or create incentives for plans
to avoid high-cost patients. In addition, while greater standardization
of care processes may reduce the use of low-value services, it may also
limit the extent to which plans accommodate differences across enrollees in either their clinical characteristics or their preferences for care.
Most private insurance plans use a combination of managed care
and patient cost sharing to control moral hazard. When Medicare was
enacted in 1965, the benefit resembled that of typical private health
insurance at the time, relying primarily on patient cost sharing to control utilization, and the basic design of the coverage has changed relatively little since the program was established. The commercial market,
in contrast, has changed dramatically since 1965, moving toward less
patient cost sharing, more restricted provider networks, and greater use
of managed care techniques. In 2011, the vast majority of the under-65
population was enrolled in a plan adopting restricted provider networks
and incorporating at least some techniques of managed care (Claxton
et al. 2011).

THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATE PLANS ON
MEDICARE SPENDING
As the programs are currently designed, both types of private insurance have increased Medicare spending and thus have contributed to—
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rather than alleviated—Medicare’s spending issues. The mechanism by
which they increase spending, however, differs.
Medigap
Medigap increases Medicare spending by covering the cost sharing
of the traditional Medicare benefit. Insurers must offer coverage that
conforms to 10 prespecified plans, and each plan is required to cover
the Part A coinsurance as well as expenditures that exceed the benefit
cap; most plans cover the Part B coinsurance and copayments (Table
7.1). The most popular plans, C and F, also cover the Part A and Part B
deductibles. Thus, people with Medigap face little to no out-of-pocket
payments for their Medicare-covered services.
While this benefit structure addresses an important weakness in the
design of the traditional benefit, the coverage ceiling for inpatient care
that exposes beneficiaries to significant financial risk, it also insulates
beneficiaries from the financial consequence of their treatment decisions. For example, without Medigap insurance, a beneficiary would
pay 20 percent of the price set by Medicare for a physician’s office visit.
With Medigap, however, the beneficiary is not required to make any
out-of-pocket payment. The reduction in price, in theory, causes beneficiaries to use more care, although the magnitude of the effect depends
on how responsive patients are to prices.
An important difference between primary and supplemental insurance is who bears the cost of the incremental utilization. When beneficiaries respond to lower out-of-pocket prices by using more care, the
majority of the incremental expenditure is financed by the Medicare
program, not the private insurer. Consider the example of the office
visit discussed above. The private insurer covered only 20 percent of
the price of the visit, while the Medicare program financed 80 percent.
Thus, the premium charged by the private insurer reflects only a portion
of the incremental expenditures generated by supplemental insurance,
making Medigap look cheap to beneficiaries relative to the value of the
services they receive. Private insurers usually prohibit enrollees from
obtaining supplemental insurance for this reason.
While a number of studies have examined how supplemental insurance affects Medicare expenditures, the estimates of the magnitude of
the effect vary from none to a 37 percent increase in Part B spending.
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The range of estimates is perhaps not surprising, however, since the
studies vary in many ways, encompassing different time periods with
different regulatory environments and varying in the degree to which
they distinguish Medigap from employer-sponsored retiree coverage
and whether they adequately control for differences in health status
between those who do and do not obtain coverage (Atherly 2001).
Taken as a whole, however, the literature suggests that Medigap likely
increases Medicare spending by approximately 15–25 percent.
In summary, while Medigap insurance provides beneficiaries with
important financial protection, particularly given that beneficiaries are
exposed to the possibility of very high out-of-pocket spending owing
to a benefit cap for Part A services, it also counteracts the incentives
for cost control in the design of the Medicare benefit. The incremental
spending caused by supplemental insurance is financed in large part by
the Medicare program.
Medicare Advantage
Although Medicare Part C was established to lower Medicare
spending, the program instead has historically increased it, mainly
because of the difficulty of setting payments for private plans in ways
that both encourage enrollment and generate savings for Medicare
(McGuire, Newhouse, and Sinaiko 2011). In the program’s early years,
the key issue was whether Medicare adequately adjusted the payments
to private plans to reflect the health status of those choosing to enroll.
When the program was established, the CMS set the payment to private
plans at 95 percent of the average of Medicare spending for beneficiaries enrolled in traditional Medicare. Enrollment in an MA plan is
voluntary, however, and those choosing to enroll have been, on average, in better health and thus less costly to insure than those choosing to
remain in the traditional program. Initially, the CMS adjusted payments
to plans using only a limited set of demographic characteristics, including age, sex, whether the beneficiary was also enrolled in Medicaid,
whether the beneficiary was institutionalized, and whether the beneficiary was employed with employer-sponsored insurance (Pope et al.
2004). These characteristics, however, explained only a small portion
of variation across beneficiaries in the annual expenditures—about 1
percent—raising the concern that the payments the CMS made for these
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enrollees exceeded what the cost would have been had the enrollees
remained in the traditional program (Newhouse et al. 1989). Brown et
al. (1993) find that it was indeed having that effect. Despite evidence
that managed care plans reduced health care spending, particularly for
less healthy enrollees, Medicare costs in the 1990s were 5.7 percent
higher than they would have been in the absence of the MA program,
owing to favorable selection.
In response to these concerns, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
mandated that the CMS use a risk-adjustment methodology that incorporated enrollee health status when setting plan payments. In 2000, the
CMS began risk adjusting payments using information on inpatient
diagnoses (MedPAC 2005; Weissman, Wachterman, and Blumenthal
2005). Subsequent legislation mandated that by 2004 the CMS base
its risk adjustment on data from both inpatient and ambulatory settings. This payment methodology was introduced gradually, with riskadjusted payments representing 30, 50, and 75 percent of a blended
rate in 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively, and payments to plans were
based entirely on a risk-adjusted rate beginning in 2007. While studies
of the effect of the risk-adjustment methodology largely agree that the
introduction of the payment methodology was associated with greater
enrollment of less-healthy beneficiaries into MA plans (Brown et al.
2012; McWilliams, Hsu, and Newhouse 2012; Morrisey et al. 2012;
Newhouse et al. 2012), the ultimate effect on Medicare spending is less
clear. One study suggests that the more refined risk-adjustment system
created greater scope for profitable favorable selection relative to payments. MA plans ultimately enrolled beneficiaries who were low cost
relative to the payment formula with the result that overpayments to
MA plans actually increased (Brown et al. 2012). Other research, however, has found that this dynamic had dissipated by 2008 (Newhouse et
al. 2012).
In the later years of the program, the level of the average payment
to MA plans, rather than the extent to which adjustments to the payment adequately compensated plans for difference in enrollee health
status, became the primary focus of concerns over whether the MA program was increasing Medicare spending. In addition to requiring more
detailed risk adjustment, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 changed
the payment formula to address differences between urban and rural
areas, which had led to low rates of plan participation in rural areas.
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The act set payment floors that essentially delinked county-level payments from historical spending levels. To offset the increase in Medicare expenditures due to the payment floors, which primarily affected
rural counties, the legislation limited the rate of increase in payments
in nonfloor counties. However, the payment floor had little effect on
encouraging plans to enter rural counties, and the payment ceiling led
plans in affected counties to reduce the generosity of the benefits they
offered enrollees. As a result, the number of plans participating in MA
and the number of beneficiaries enrolled declined dramatically between
1998 and 2002 (Figure 7.1).
Aiming to enhance the role of the private sector in Medicare, the
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 reversed this trend by increasing
the average plan payment. The act stipulated that Medicare would pay
the highest of an urban or rural floor payment, 100 percent of riskadjusted per capita spending in Medicare, a minimum update over the
prior year of 2 percent or traditional Medicare’s national expenditure
growth rate, and a blended payment (McGuire, Newhouse, and Sinaiko
2011). This formula guaranteed that average payment rates were at
least as high as traditional Medicare spending in a particular county
and locked in higher payments, even for counties experiencing relatively low-cost growth in the traditional Medicare program by linking
the payment update to growth in national spending. MedPAC (2006)
estimated that 2004 payments to MA plans averaged 107 percent of
expected Medicare fee-for-service costs, not accounting for potential
favorable selection. In 2006, Medicare instituted a system of plan bidding in which the CMS sets county-level benchmark payments and
plans submit bids in response to the benchmarks. For plans submitting
bids exceeding the benchmark, beneficiaries are responsible for paying the difference between the bid and the benchmark when enrolling.
Plans bidding under the benchmark receive 75 percent of the difference
as a rebate but must return the rebate to the beneficiaries in the form of
additional benefits. Even after the implementation of the bidding system, MedPAC estimated that payments to MA were 111 percent of traditional Medicare costs (MedPAC 2006).
Figure 7.1 shows trends in plan participation and beneficiary enrollment in MA plans over time. Both enrollment and plan participation
increased until the late 1990s, when plans began to exit the program in
response to the rate reductions generated by the Balanced Budget Act of
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Figure 7.1 Plan Participation and Beneficiary Enrollment in
Medicare Advantage
800
700

30
Number of contracts

Percent of beneficiaries enrolled
25

20

Contracts

500
400

15

300

Percent enrolled

600

10

200
5

100
0

1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011

0

1997 and enrollment declined correspondingly. The payment increases
generated by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 reversed the
trend, with plan participation slowly increasing in early 2000 and then
growing rapidly through 2009. Enrollment in MA plans increased
correspondingly.
The history of the relationship between MA payment rates and plan
participation and enrollment in MA plans demonstrates the tension
policymakers face when trying to use the program both to provide beneficiaries with more choices and to control Medicare spending. When
payments in urban areas rose less quickly during the late 1990s in order
to contain program expenditures, plans dropped out of the program,
the generosity of the benefits they offered declined, and enrollment
declined correspondingly (Figure 7.1). When plan payments increased
in the mid-2000s, plan participation and enrollment in the program
increased, but so did Medicare spending. According to McGuire, Newhouse, and Sinaiko (2011), satisfying both these goals would require
Medicare payment policy to “thread the policy needle.”
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THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PLANS IN MEDICARE
What role should private plans play in Medicare’s future? To date,
Medigap and MA have exacerbated rather than alleviated Medicare’s
financing challenges by raising program costs. Yet, the more fundamental challenge is not simply to lower the rate of growth of program
spending, but to provide Medicare-financed services more efficiently—
to spend less but maintain or even improve quality of care. Achieving
this objective, however, will require a significant change in how Medicare interacts with both providers and beneficiaries at the point of service. In the private insurance market, these relationships have evolved
dramatically over time with the implementation of more sophisticated
systems of patient cost sharing and the development of alternative ways
of contracting with providers. The Medicare program, in contrast, has
remained a relatively passive purchaser, paying providers mostly on a
fee-for-service basis and providing few incentives for beneficiaries to
consider both quality and cost when seeking care.
The Medicare program could achieve this transition through two
types of approaches. First, it could reinvent itself as a more proactive
purchaser of health care. In this scenario, the program would essentially
be reformed from the inside by redesigning provider payment methods
to promote the delivery of high-value care and restructuring the benefit
package to engage patients more fully in considering both cost and quality of treatment decisions. The program has already taken steps in this
direction in recent years, particularly in its relationships with providers, through the development of quality reporting systems and pay-forperformance for particular types of services (Tanenbaum 2009). The
ACA contains a number of provisions that continue this approach
(James 2012). Perhaps the most well-known example is the establishment of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), which are groups of
providers that agree to be held responsible for a defined group of beneficiaries and are rewarded financially if the Medicare expenditures for
the group are lower than projected. The act also introduced a program
designed to reduce potentially avoidable hospital readmissions. Under
the current fee-for-service system, hospitals have little financial incentive to invest in after-discharge follow-up care, which would prevent
future admissions, since they do not benefit financially from these activ-
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ities, and even potentially forego the profit associated with the future
admission. Hospitals are now financially penalized for high readmission rates (Joynt and Jha 2013).
Medicare is the largest purchaser of health services in the country,
and its size makes this approach more feasible, since the program has
the purchasing leverage to drive substantive change in provider practice.
For example, after Medicare adopted prospective payment for inpatient
hospital admission in the 1980s, many private insurers soon followed,
negotiating prices based on the diagnosis-related group definitions used
by the CMS. While Medicare’s sheer size may be an advantage in creating incentives for providers to adopt new payment methods or other
types of innovations, such as electronic medical records, its role as a
governmental organization creates other types of barriers. While some
express concern over whether a government-run monopoly can be adequately incentivized to produce services efficiently, another important
difference between public and private insurers is the political pressure
they face. In addition to the enrollees who rely on the program for their
health care, Medicare is beholden to a variety of stakeholders because
of the size of the program relative to the overall economy. Medicare
administrative decisions can have dramatic financial consequences for
physicians, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, device manufacturers, local governments, and others, leading to continuous congressional involvement in the program as representatives respond to their
particular set of constituents. Kessler (2012) proposes that Medicare’s
vulnerability to congressional micromanagement makes the program
fundamentally unable to make the difficult decisions that would be
required to relentlessly focus on the delivery of high-value care. Perhaps the most visible example of how politics affects the operation of
the program is the development of physician reimbursement policy. As
part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress reformed physician payment policy by linking fee increases to an expenditure target in
order to contain physician expenditures (Congressional Budget Office
2006). However, every year since 2003, Congress has blocked the formula from taking effect, since it would substantially reduce physician
fees, potentially threatening beneficiaries’ access to care (Jacobs 2013).
Although many policymakers agree that the formula needs to be fixed
to create a more stable, long-term payment policy, there has not yet
been bipartisan agreement on a solution.
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The primary alternative to “reform from within” is to restructure
Medicare as a marketplace of government-subsidized, regulated private plans, a model often referred to as “premium support.” Rather than
receive an open-ended guarantee to cover all medically necessary services, beneficiaries would instead receive a fixed payment in the form
of a voucher for a defined set of services and could direct the payment to
the private plan of their choice (MedPAC 2013a). While this approach is
attractive from a government budgeting perspective because it provides
policymakers with more control over Medicare spending through control of the voucher size, its theoretical rationale is based on the potential
benefits of competition among health plans as a mechanism to promote
efficient utilization of care. A voucher would expose beneficiaries to
the higher costs of more expensive plans, introducing price sensitivity
at the point of insurance purchase. Competition among plans for enrollees, in turn, would create incentives for plans to develop mechanisms to
control cost and increase quality of care. This is an important deviation
from the existing Medicare program because it rewards beneficiaries
for using care more parsimoniously through their choice of a lowerpremium plan. This approach also creates the opportunity for variation across plans in both the generosity of benefits and the structure of
delivery system, allowing for better customization of care for individual
preferences. From a political economy perspective, premium support
shifts the responsibility for implementing managed care mechanisms
from the public to the private sector, creating less opportunity for political interference in plan management (Kessler 2012).
Opponents of premium support raise two types of concerns. First,
while the intent is to harness the power of competition to provide more
effective care, plans may compete in less socially beneficial ways, such
as by trying to enroll beneficiaries in better health or by withholding
access to beneficial care. While the policy response to the potential
for risk selection is to adjust payments to plans to reflect differences
among enrollees in their expected costs, whether existing systems of
risk adjustment adequately ameliorate these incentives remains an open
question (Brown et al. 2012; McWilliams, Hsu, and Newhouse 2012).
In the case of concerns over “stinting,” the policy response is to provide consumers with information on plan quality. This would provide a
mechanism for the market to reward high-quality plans in the form of
higher rates of enrollment. As in the case of risk adjustment, although
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the availability of this type of information has increased dramatically in
recent years, there is still some uncertainty over whether this approach
would adequately address these types of concerns.
The other concern from the perspective of beneficiaries is the extent
to which premium support shifts responsibility for financing health
care from taxpayers to beneficiaries. This depends primarily on how
the level of the voucher is set. The amount the government contributes
could be chosen administratively, as it has been traditionally done in
the MA program, or it could be determined through a market process
(MedPAC 2013b). If the level of the voucher is set administratively, then
a key issue is how the voucher is adjusted over time. Because increases
in health care costs typically exceed inflation, linking the level of the
voucher to the rate of growth of the economy as a whole would transfer
an increasing portion of financing of health care costs to beneficiaries
over time. Voucher amounts linked to growth in health care spending, in
contrast, provide greater protection for beneficiaries against health care
cost growth. An alternative is to set the level of the voucher through a
competitive process. In Medicare Part D, plans submit bids for covering beneficiaries, and the subsidy is calculated as a share of the average national bid. Linking the subsidy to a market-determined level of
health care spending protects beneficiaries from market trends specific
to health care.
Medicare beneficiaries have had a private alternative to the traditional benefit for nearly 20 years, however, so why has Medicare Part
C not been more successful in generating greater value from Medicarefinanced services? The current program suffers not necessarily from
the inability of private plans to provide care more efficiently but from
the lack of incentives for beneficiaries to seek out more efficient alternatives. One reason is that MA plans are limited in the ways in which
they are able to transfer any savings they generate to beneficiaries. In
particular, they may not pay beneficiaries to enroll. Instead, they must
transfer any cost savings they generate to beneficiaries in the form of
additional benefits. This results in the provision of products and services of relatively low value to beneficiaries and lessens plans’ incentives to provide care more efficiently. Another reason is that MA plans
currently compete not against just traditional Medicare but against the
combination of Medicare and supplemental insurance. As discussed
earlier, however, much of the incremental utilization associated with
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supplemental insurance is financed by the Medicare program, making
premiums for supplemental coverage low relative to the benefits it provides. The relative attractiveness to beneficiaries of traditional Medicare plus Medigap, which is financed primarily by taxpayers, makes
MA plans less attractive.
Not only does the availability of Medigap coverage limit enrollment
in MA plans, but it also weakens the likely effectiveness of “reform
from within” by essentially taking patient cost sharing off the table as
a mechanism to influence utilization of care. For example, the financial
incentives of ACOs, while intended to create incentives for these organizations to provide care more efficiently, also create a tension between
beneficiaries and providers. The savings associated with lower utilization of care ultimately benefit providers and taxpayers rather than beneficiaries themselves, since they have little to no cost sharing and thus
do not experience a decline in their out-of-pocket spending. Helchem et
al. (2013) propose a “shared-savings supplement” in which beneficiaries would receive a cash payment for choosing a lower cost option to
restore patient incentives in the face of supplemental insurance.
The implication of the interrelationships between Medigap and
the traditional program is that effective reform of the Medicare program will also require reform of the Medigap market. The tension in
reforming this market, however, is how to provide beneficiaries with
catastrophic risk protection while limiting the extent to which that protection promotes inefficient use of care. One potential approach is to
restructure the cost sharing associated with traditional Medicare. For
example, MedPAC has recommended redesigning the traditional Medicare benefit by creating an out-of-pocket maximum for cost sharing,
maintaining the Part A and B deductibles (and possibly combining
them into a single deductible), replacing coinsurance with copayments
for most services, and allowing the secretary to adjust the cost sharing
for specific services based on their value to patients (MedPAC 2012b).
With this type of restructuring, the basic benefit would provide beneficiaries protection from large expenditures but retain incentives for them
to avoid low-value care.
While improving the benefit design of the traditional Medicare program would likely reduce demand for supplemental coverage, reform
of the Medigap market may be necessary as well. In general, Medigap
reform should be guided by the objective of limiting the extent to
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which the incremental costs associated with the purchase of supplemental insurance are borne by taxpayers rather than beneficiaries. In
particular, policymakers could restrict Medigap plans from providing
first-dollar coverage or require them to apply copayments for certain
services. Alternatively, they could tax plans providing first-dollar coverage or charge Medicare beneficiaries a fee if they purchase supplemental insurance, where the tax or the fee reflected the incremental cost
the coverage generates for the Medicare program.

CONCLUSION
To date, private health insurance has done little to improve the efficiency of the delivery of Medicare-financed services and has actually
increased Medicare spending. Medigap insurance has aggravated the
inefficiencies associated with traditional Medicare coverage, and while
MA plans have the potential to improve the efficiency of service delivery, the design of the Part C benefit limits the ability of plans to pass
these efficiencies on to enrollees, and the availability of Medigap coverage further dilutes the incentives of beneficiaries to enroll in plans that
provide care more efficiently. While private plans have the potential to
be part of solutions to Medicare’s budget challenges, this would require
reform to the traditional Medicare program, the supplemental insurance
market, and the MA program.
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